Constitutional Structure, Institutional Relationships and Text: Revisiting Charles Black’s White Lectures by Boldt, Richard C.
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
Volume 54 Number 3 Article 1 
Spring 5-1-2021 
Constitutional Structure, Institutional Relationships and Text: 
Revisiting Charles Black’s White Lectures 
Richard C. Boldt 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard C. Boldt, Constitutional Structure, Institutional Relationships and Text: Revisiting Charles Black’s 
White Lectures, 54 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 675 (2021). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola 
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. 
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 




INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND TEXT: 
REVISITING CHARLES BLACK’S WHITE 
LECTURES 
Richard C. Boldt* 
           Fundamental questions about constitutional interpretation and 
meaning invite a close examination of the complicated origins and the 
subsequent elaboration of the very structure of federalism. The 
available records of the Proceedings in the Federal Convention make 
clear that the Framers entertained two approaches to delineating the 
powers of the central government relative to those retained by the 
states. The competing approaches, one reliant on a formalist 
enumeration of permissible powers, the other operating functionally on 
the basis of a broad dynamic concept of state incompetence and 
national interest, often are presented as mutually inconsistent 
narratives. In fact, these two approaches can be understood, at the 
founding and at critical junctures along the way, as capable of 
coexisting in a complex, sometimes uncomfortable, arrangement that 
draws both upon structural and specific textual elements of grant or 
prohibition to police the line between central government powers and 
those retained by the states. 
           Some of the specific provisions of grant or prohibition in the 
Constitution have held up well over the course of our nation’s history, 
but others have fallen out of alignment with the underlying economic, 
social, and political context within which the Constitution must operate. 
In those instances, significant pressure has been placed on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to bring constitutional doctrine into 
alignment with contemporary circumstance and, indirectly, with the 
deeper structures and relationships that ground the constitutional 
order. Consistent with the insights offered decades ago by Professor 
Charles Black, this Article argues that the Supreme Court better serves 
the constitutional order when it draws inferences directly from those 
deeper structures and institutional relationships, which were embedded 
in the original Constitution and which have endured and been 
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reaffirmed over time, and avoids a strained reading either of the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among Professor Charles Black’s many contributions to the 
constitutional law literature, perhaps his most important is contained 
in a slight book, derived from his Edward Douglass White Lectures 
on Citizenship at the Louisiana State University, on the role that 
structure and relationship plays, and should play, in constitutional 
interpretation.1 A centerpiece of Black’s analysis was his discussion 
of Chief Justice Marshall’s towering opinion in McCulloch v. 
Maryland,2 and in particular, Marshall’s treatment of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.3 Professor Black’s position was that Marshall did 
not rely on that specific bit of text as the basis for finding national 
government power to create a national bank, but instead considered it 
in order to dispel the argument, originally advanced by Thomas 
Jefferson and others during the debate over the first national bank,4 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause actually serves a limiting 
function on the powers enumerated for exercise by Congress.5 Black 
powerfully demonstrated that Marshall’s understanding of federal 
regulatory power was grounded in the broader structure of the whole 
constitutional system and in the institutional relationships set up in 
the Constitution. Black’s view was that understanding federalism 
issues in this functionalist fashion frequently is superior to the more 
formalist, text-focused approach that the Court has from time-to-time 
adopted in the Commerce Clause area and elsewhere.6 
 
 1. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1969). 
 2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 3. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 13–15. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides that 
Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 4. For a discussion of the arguments advanced by Thomas Jefferson in response to 
President George Washington’s request that he and several other cabinet members provide an 
opinion on the constitutionality of the First Bank of the United States, see Randy E. Barnett, The 
Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 195–96 
(2003); see also J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 602 (discussing Marshall’s refutation of Maryland’s narrow 
construction of the term “necessary”). 
 5. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 14. 
 6. See id. at 22–23. For an overview of formalist and functionalist methods of constitutional 
interpretation in the federalism area, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in 
Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1997). 
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Recently, in United States v. Comstock,7 a case in which the 
federal government’s authority to civilly commit so-called sexual 
predators was challenged on the ground that the authorizing statute 
exceeded the central government’s enumerated and implied 
authority, the majority relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
a distinct source of federal lawmaking power.8 That reading, and a 
similar approach in relatively recent Commerce Clause cases and 
others raising the question of federal authority,9 is in some tension 
with Professor Black’s vision because it fails to exploit the 
interpretive potential of the broader structural values recognized in 
McCulloch.10 This Article argues that Professor Black’s approach 
frequently is a superior way to think through difficult questions of 
federalism, and would, if adopted, promote candor and improved 
collaboration between the judiciary and the political branches. 
A full consideration of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
implicates institutional questions, questions of interpretive 
methodology, and questions of meaning. Some recent scholarship 
has focused on the institutional question, arguing either that the 
Supreme Court should be deferential to Congress’s assertions of 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause or that the Court 
should exercise a measure of independent judgment with respect to 
the reach of that provision.11 On the question of the meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, provocative historical accounts have 
become available that seek to connect contemporary understandings 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause to eighteenth-century English 
usage derived from agency law, administrative law, and corporations 
 
 7. 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
 8. Id. at 129–30. The Court read the Necessary and Proper Clause as conferring incidental 
lawmaking power beyond that provided in the other enumerated provisions in Article I, Section 8, 
but in support of those enumerated powers. For a further discussion of Comstock, see infra text 
accompanying notes 216–20. 
 9. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 10. The Comstock majority opinion does show some ambivalence in this regard by referring 
at times to the effect of the Necessary and Proper Clause as “granting” power to Congress and at 
others as merely confirming the existence of such authority. See infra text accompanying notes 
216–19. 
 11. Compare John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of 
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2014) (reading the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as conferring broad implementing authority on Congress to which the Court should show 
deference), with William Baude, Sharing the Necessary and Proper Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 39, 46–47 (2014) (arguing that the text and historical practice permit greater judicial authority 
and require less deference to Congress). 
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law.12 Implicit in these efforts is the notion that the constitutional 
phrase reflected, and likely was understood at the time to embody, 
existing pre-constitutional legal constructs having to do with the 
obligations of fiduciaries to exercise reasonable judgment in tasks 
otherwise assigned to them.13 
This effort to uncover and describe older English legal 
constructs that likely were familiar to the Framers and other lawyers 
of their generation, in order to assist in the interpretation of the 
constitutional text as it was promulgated and ratified, implicates 
questions of interpretive methodology. Should the existence and 
scope of federal powers turn, in the first instance, on the best reading 
of specific constitutional language, including the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, or should the interpretive project be centered on 
structure and institutional relationship? And if constitutional text is 
the starting point, should the focus be on “passages of grant or 
prohibition,” or instead on passages that “recognize political and 
societal structures”?14 If specific text is to play a central role in the 
interpretive process, is original intention or original meaning15—
perhaps informed by historical accounts of pre-existing private law 
constructs or by accounts of the deliberations that took place in the 
constitutional convention or during the ratification process16—the 
best or even a good way to engage the words on the page? And, 
 
 12. See GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, 
THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 119 (2010). 
 13. Professor Natelson, for example, argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause drew upon 
principles of British agency law that included a requirement of reasonableness and other fiduciary 
obligations of good faith and due care. See id. John Manning points out, however, that the phrase 
“necessary and proper” appeared in a wide variety of other eighteenth-century public law contexts 
and that Natelson and his co-authors do not necessarily claim one uniform or consistent meaning 
for the phrase. See John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper Clause and Its Legal 
Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1373–74 (2012). 
 14. Vince Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in Constitutional Law, 80 YALE L.J. 176, 182 
(1970) (reviewing CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1969)). 
 15. On the differences between the “old originalism,” which focused on the “the concrete 
intentions of individual drafters of [the] constitution,” and the “new originalism,” which focuses 
instead on the “public meaning of the text that was adopted,” see Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599–613 (2004). For a careful parsing of the terms 
“meaning,” “intention,” and “understanding,” all of which are common in originalist analysis, see 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 7–11 (1996). 
 16. See generally Barnett, supra note 4, at 183–221 (exploring the “original public meaning 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause” and highlighting the difference between “the subjective 
original intent of the framers . . . [and] the original meaning”). 
(6) 54.3_BOLDT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/21  2:36 PM 
2021] REVISITING CHARLES BLACK’S WHITE LECTURES 681 
finally, does the evidence of original meaning support an analytic 
approach to federalism issues that focuses on the enumeration of 
powers found in Article I, Section 8, together with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, or does that evidence encourage us to engage more 
attentively the consideration of constitutional structure and 
institutional relationships that Professor Black urges? 
These fundamental questions about constitutional interpretation 
and meaning implicate the uncertain text and promulgation history of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. With respect to the uncertainty of 
the language, Chief Justice Marshall pointedly noted in McCulloch 
that even if that clause were to be given independent linguistic and 
legal significance, the word “necessary” in that provision “has not a 
fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of 
comparison; and is often connected with other words . . . . A thing 
may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably 
necessary.”17 With respect to the clause’s promulgation history, the 
historical evidence is far from clear as to what motivated the 
convention participants to insert this provision and what it was meant 
to accomplish.18 Some scholars argue that the phrase was included to 
ensure that the central government’s express general powers would 
be supplemented by additional authority to enact implementing 
measures reaching beyond the strict limits of the enumerations.19 
Others point to statements at the time indicating that the clause was 
regarded as redundant to, and at best confirming of, implied powers 
already conveyed in the constitutional arrangements the Framers had 
settled on.20 
In addition, however, these fundamental questions about 
interpretation and meaning also invite a closer examination of the 
complicated origins and the subsequent elaboration of the very 
structure of federalism at the foundations of the constitutional regime 
itself. The available records of the Proceedings in the Federal 
Convention make clear that the Framers entertained conflicting 
approaches to delineating the powers of the central government 
 
 17. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414–15 (1819). But see Barnett, supra 
note 4, at 204–05 (relying on notes from the Constitutional Convention to argue that the Framers’ 
choice of words in this respect was “considerably less deliberat[e]” than Marshall suggested). 
 18. Barnett, supra note 4, at 204–05. 
 19. See Manning, supra note 11, at 6–7. 
 20. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 185–86 (tracing this view to Federalist supporters of the 
Constitution, such as George Nicholas of Virginia). 
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relative to those retained by the states. In a series of debates and 
votes taken in May and July of 1787, the members of the Convention 
approved language granting generalized power to the federal 
government delimited functionally by reference to the incompetence 
of the individual states.21 Thus, on July 17, 1787, a majority of the 
delegates, voting by state, approved language that would permit the 
federal legislature “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of 
the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately 
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be 
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”22 In August of 
1787, however, the Committee of Detail presented a report to the full 
Convention that contained an enumeration of powers to be held by 
the legislature of the central government, and that contained at its 
conclusion a necessary and proper clause.23 This formulation, of 
course, found its way into Article I, Section 8 of the version of the 
Constitution that was ultimately presented to the states and ratified.24 
Constitutional lawyers, academics, and others have offered 
competing interpretations of this history, which are relevant to the 
questions of constitutional interpretation and meaning raised by 
Professor Black’s appeal to reasoning from structure and 
relationship. By one account, “[t]he enumeration by the Committee 
of Detail, which the Convention employed as a basis for final action, 
should be construed to reach towards the same generalized grant of 
power to the national government which the Convention had earlier 
approved.”25 This account fits most comfortably with an approach to 
federalism based on structural reasoning.26 From another perspective, 
 
 21. See Day-by-Day Summary of the Convention, TEACHING AM. HIST., 
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/resources/convention/summary/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2021). 
 22. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
[hereinafter THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2]. 
 23. Id. at 176, 181–82. 
 24. See id. at 181–82 (Madison’s Notes). 
 25. JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 107 (15th ed. 2017). 
 26. While Charles Black’s White Lectures describe one approach to reasoning from structure 
and relationship, other scholars have offered a broader account of structural constitutional 
interpretation. Brannon Denning and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, for example, have suggested that 
structural reasoning draws upon “inferences derived from related constitutional provisions, the 
overall structure of the Constitution, and the principles that animated its framing.” Brannon P. 
Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1089–90 
(1997). Philip Bobbitt has explained that, 
the structural approach, unlike much doctrinalism, is grounded in the actual text of the 
Constitution. But, unlike textualist arguments, the passages that are significant are not 
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however, “[t]he decision to enumerate the powers of Congress 
reflects a decision sharply to circumscribe national power.”27 This 
perspective is much more difficult to square with a broad structural 
interpretive approach, and imposes on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause a potentially significant role in providing the constitutional 
basis for finding the incidental powers required by Congress. 
These competing approaches to marking out the boundaries of 
the American federalist system, one reliant on a formalist 
enumeration of permissible powers, the other operating functionally 
on the basis of a broad dynamic concept of state incompetence and 
national interest, have been present from the very beginning of our 
constitutional order and often are presented as mutually inconsistent 
narratives. In fact, these two approaches can be understood, at the 
founding and at critical junctures along the way, as capable of 
coexisting in a complex, sometimes uncomfortable, arrangement; an 
arrangement which supports an interpretive approach that draws both 
upon structural and specific textual elements “directive of action” to 
police the line between central government powers and those 
retained by the states.28 
Some of the specific provisions in Article I, Section 8 have held 
up well over the course of our nation’s history, but others have fallen 
out of alignment with the underlying economic, social, and political 
context within which the Constitution must operate. In those 
instances, where a specific textual grant of power represents a 
 
those of express grants of power or particular prohibitions but instead those which, by 
setting up structures of a certain kind, permit us to draw the requirements of the 
relationships among structures. 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 80 (1982). 
 27. VARAT & AMAR, supra note 25, at 107. 
 28. BLACK, supra note 1, at 7. Jack Rakove has described “two complementary sets of 
meanings” with which Americans have “endowed” the Constitution since it was presented for 
ratification in 1787. RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 11. One meaning derives from the Constitution 
“[t]aken as a whole—which is how the ratifiers had to take it.” Id. The other is made up of a 
series of disputes about the import of individual clauses. Id. Rakove knits together these two 
meanings in the following terms: 
The Constitution has thus always represented something more than the sum of its parts. 
But since 1789, most disputes about its meaning have necessarily centered on its 
individual clauses. No single clause or provision can be interpreted without considering 
its relation to the document as a whole. Yet in practice, the enterprise of interpretation 
often requires an intense analysis of key words and brief phrases that the Constitution 
itself does not define. . . . These two conceptions of the meaning of the Constitution are 
complementary, not contradictory. 
Id. at 11–12. 
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miscalculation, significant pressure has been placed on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause to bring constitutional doctrine into alignment 
with contemporary circumstance and, indirectly, with the deeper 
structures and relationships that ground the constitutional order. This 
Article argues that the Supreme Court better serves the constitutional 
order when it draws inferences directly from those deeper structures 
and institutional relationships, which have endured and have been 
reaffirmed over time, and avoids a strained reading either of the 
enumerated power itself or of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
The remainder of this Article elaborates this alternative 
interpretive approach. The discussion proceeds as follows: Part I 
takes up Professor Black’s theory of reasoning from structure and 
relationship and explores its operation relative to more conventional 
approaches to reading the Constitution. Part II examines the state 
incompetence principle and the turn to an enumerative approach in 
the Framers’ adoption of Article 1, Section 8, and then offers an 
account of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause that helps to reconcile these competing elements in 
our constitutional tradition. Part III explores the reasoning of the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts with respect to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, which has been characterized as a new form of 
structuralism and has been linked to the interpretive approach set out 
in Charles Black’s work, and argues that, while an accurate account 
of the modern Court’s cases, this is a misreading of Black. The 
Article then concludes by applying Professor Black’s theory of 
structure and relationship to some contemporary federalism cases in 
order to demonstrate how it might function to help reconcile notions 
of fidelity to an original constitutional master text with a coexisting 
“living discursive tradition” of constitutional elaboration and 
development.29 
 
 29. Peter G. Danchin, From Parliamentary to Judicial Supremacy: Reflections in Honour of 
the Constitutionalism of Justice Moseneke, 17 ACTA JURIDICA 29, 36 (2017); see also Jack M. 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007) (describing a 
form of constitutional interpretation that “requires fidelity to the original meaning of the 
Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text,” but which is “consistent with a basic law 
whose reach and application evolve over time, a basic law that leaves to each generation the task 
of how to make sense of the Constitution’s words and principles”). 
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PART I 
A.  Charles Black on Reasoning from Constitutional Structures and 
Institutional Relationships 
In the first of three lectures delivered at the Louisiana State 
University in 1968 as the Edward Douglass White Lectures, 
Professor Black described the prevailing approach to interpretation in 
American constitutional thought in the following terms: 
[I]n dealing with questions of constitutional law, we have 
preferred the method of purported explication or exegesis of 
the particular textual passage considered as a direction of 
action, as opposed to the method of inference from the 
structures and relationships created by the constitution in all 
its parts or in some principal part.30 
To illustrate how this “preference of intellectual method”31 has 
operated over time, and to demonstrate the potential benefits of his 
proffered alternative, Professor Black marched onto center stage a 
series of Supreme Court decisions that would have been entirely 
familiar to students of constitutional law at the time. The illustrative 
cases are not all federalism decisions. They included, among others, 
an Equal Protection case,32 a First Amendment opinion,33 a state 
action decision,34 and, of course, McCulloch v. Maryland.35 Black’s 
purpose in discussing each of these cases was not to dismiss the use 
of specific directive constitutional language as the basis for 
adjudicating constitutional conflicts, but to call into question the 
heavy reliance on that approach that has grown up in American 
constitutional law.36 By contrast, Professor Black drew out of his 
selected cases a collection of “structures and relationships”—a 
 
 30. BLACK, supra note 1, at 7. Professor Black characterized this way of thinking as 
incomplete, due to its failure to develop a “full-bodied case-law of inference from constitutional 
structure and relation but even to a preference, among texts, for those which are in form directive 
of official conduct, rather than for those that declare or create a relationship out of the existence 
of which inference could be drawn.” Id. at 8. 
 31. Id. at 3. 
 32. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
 33. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 34. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). 
 35. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 36. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 21. “Black is thus protesting not the exclusivity of the 
textual mode so much as the ‘stylistic preference’ by which judges . . . have come to employ the 
reasoning process of textual interpretation over that of structural and relational inference.” Blasi, 
supra note 14, at 180. 
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phrase he treated as something of a term of art—that he suggested 
the Court in each instance might have deployed as the anchor for an 
alternative analytic approach, often supporting the same outcomes 
that the majority decisions in fact reached on the basis of inference 
from narrower textual grounds.37 Black’s catalogue of structures and 
relationships comprises a collection of constitutional principles that 
are “either established in some detail by the text of the Constitution 
or else . . . plainly envisioned by an important provision of that 
text.”38 Three of these structural principles are of particular relevance 
to the ongoing struggle over the contours of federalism: (1) “the bare 
existence, irrespective of its character, of a federal government that is 
supreme over the state governments;” (2) “the economic structure of 
nationhood;” and (3) a structure of “national unity,” which, among 
other things, “warrants inference as to mobility of population.”39 
Professor Black was not cavalier in his identification of the 
structures and relationships he regarded as fundamental, and it is 
difficult to quarrel with his judgment that these principles are 
“soundly enough established to furnish a basis” for resolving 
constitutional disputes.40 Indeed, he assembled a group of principles 
that virtually all constitutional lawyers would regard as essential 
elements of our constitutional tradition.41 Given this universality, 
Black argued, it is disappointing how infrequently these principles 
have been relied upon by the Supreme Court as the doctrinal 
foundation for individual decisions.42 
Black convincingly demonstrated that Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in McCulloch is an exception to this pattern. Students of 
Marshall’s opinion are familiar with the essentially structural 
approach to the second issue in the case, the question whether the 
state of Maryland could impose a tax on the operation of a national 
instrumentality, the Second National Bank.43 Clearly, Marshall’s 
emphasis on “the warranted relational proprieties between the 
 
 37. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 8–29. 
 38. Blasi, supra note 14, at 182. 
 39. Id.; BLACK, supra note 1, at 20–21, 28. In addition to these essential structural 
principles, Black also identified the central role that the electorate plays in the federal 
government, the availability of federal judicial forums for citizens’ grievances, and the concept of 
citizenship. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 182. 
 40. BLACK, supra note 1, at 23. 
 41. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 182–83. 
 42. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 31–32. 
 43. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425–37 (1819). 
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national government and the government of the states” and the 
“structural corollaries of national supremacy”44 was dispositive of 
the issue.45 But, Black argued, Marshall’s treatment of the first issue, 
whether the national government had the constitutional authority to 
charter a national bank, is also essentially structural, notwithstanding 
the Court’s familiar discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause.46 
Black explained,  
[a] reasonably careful reading shows that Marshall does not 
place principal reliance on this clause as a ground of 
decision; that before he reaches it he has already decided, 
on the basis of far more general implications, that Congress 
possesses the power, not expressly named, of establishing a 
bank and chartering corporations.47 
This process of drawing legally dispositive inferences from 
structures and relationships embedded in the whole Constitution 
rather than from individual constitutional provisions that grant power 
or set express prohibitions is not entirely foreign to American 
constitutional practice after McCulloch.48 For example, Justice 
Douglas’s majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut49 deployed 
structural reasoning to find a constitutional right to privacy as the 
basis for striking down a Connecticut statute forbidding the sale and 
use of contraceptives. Douglas wrote that: 
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of 
privacy. . . . The present case . . . concerns a relationship 
 
 44. BLACK, supra note 1, at 15. 
 45. Id. at 14. In particular, Chief Justice Marshall’s emphasis on the fact that the people in 
the states find representation in the national legislature and should not be obligated to rely on the 
good faith of state legislatures in which they are not formally represented. See McCulloch, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428. 
 46. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411–23. 
 47. BLACK, supra note 1, at 14. 
 48. See BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 74–81; Denning & Reynolds, supra note 26, at 1089–
120. In fact, David Schwartz has offered a historical account showing that, while McCulloch was 
not particularly influential in establishing nationalist constitutional principles in the first few 
decades after its publication, it did embed the essential idea that reading the Constitution requires 
something more than clause-bound statutory interpretation techniques. See DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, 
THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF 
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (2019). 
 49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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lying within the zone of privacy created by several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees.50 
David Luban has explained that this passage from Griswold is 
amenable to two readings, both structural.51 The first, which he 
attributes to Robert Bork,52 understands Douglas to suggest that each 
of the textually identified guarantees in the Bill of Rights—the First, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments—carries with it a 
protective “buffer zone” that prophylactically ensures the vitality of 
the core right.53 In this reading, these respective buffer zones of 
protection then “fuse” into a more general right to privacy.54 This is 
structural reasoning, because it derives a broad principle of 
constitutional importance—privacy—from the combined 
contributions of a number of individual provisions in the written text. 
While Bork was willing to accept the constitutional propriety of 
recognizing individual zones of protection around each rights 
guarantee,55 he criticized Douglas’s approach because he understood 
the fusing of these zones into a new general right to privacy, which is 
the structural reasoning element here, as an unwarranted additional 
step too far removed from the textual provisions of grant or 
prohibition that are the source of the claimed constitutional 
protection.56 Luban’s alternative reading of the famous language 
from Griswold is structural in a different sense. On this account the 
right to privacy identified by Justice Douglas was not derived from 
the protective zones around each textually specified guarantee but 
instead overhangs all of those provisions and is revealed by them, 
operating together. Luban explains that “Griswold does not use a 
two-step method to construct the right of privacy, with one step 
deriving penumbral rights and the next step fusing them, as Bork 
suggests.”57 “Griswold’s method,” says Luban, “is instead a Platonic 
 
 50. Id. at 484–85 (citation omitted). 
 51. See David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 7 (1999). 
 52. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 95–100 (1990). 
 53. Luban, supra note 51, at 28–29. 
 54. Id. 
 55. This is somewhat analogous to reading the Necessary and Proper Clause as confirming 
the existence of implied powers created by the express enumerations of power contained in 
Article I, Section 8. See infra text accompanying notes 216–20 (discussing this analogous notion). 
 56. See Luban, supra note 51, at 29. 
 57. Id. at 36. 
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mirror-image of the activist derivation of penumbral rights.”58 That 
is, instead of deriving rights penumbral to the specific rights in the 
Bill of Rights, Douglas understands each of those textual guarantees 
“as itself the penumbra of some principle that allows us to 
understand what it is doing in the Constitution.”59 The right to 
privacy, then, does not grow out of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Ninth Amendments, but instead informs those specific guarantees 
and is revealed by them.60 
In his review of Structure and Relationship, which appeared in 
the Yale Law Journal several years after the book’s publication, 
Professor Vince Blasi noted that attention to constitutional language 
plays an important role in Professor Black’s method of reasoning, 
just as it does in the dominant approach that Black set up as his 
foil.61 Indeed, he makes clear that Black’s method was intended as “a 
supplement to, not as a substitute for, the dominant technique of 
textual interpretation.”62 Black encouraged a sort of dialogue 
between the two interpretive approaches, observing “a close and 
perpetual interworking between the textual and the relational and 
structural modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations 
concerned are themselves created by the text, and inference drawn 
from them must surely be controlled by the text.”63 What is 
distinctive about Black’s approach is that his textual foundations are 
different. “[T]he departure points for [Black’s method of] reasoning 
are not the familiar textual passages of grant or prohibition, but 
rather other textual passages that recognize political and societal 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 26, for additional discussion of Griswold as an 
example of the Court’s use of structural, or “penumbral,” reasoning. Mark Graber describes this 
form of constitutional reasoning as “aspirationalism.” Such arguments, he explains, “are based on 
the particular conception of justice underlying the Constitution. . . . Constitutional provisions are 
then interpreted and applied in light of these broader constitutional commitments.” MARK A. 
GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 85 (2013). In Graber’s 
typography of constitutional arguments, aspirationalism is treated as distinct from structural 
reasoning, which “deduce[s] constitutional powers and limitations from the general arrangements 
of the constitutional order and the relationships between governing institutions.” Id. at 81. For 
present purposes, this Article regards both forms of constitutional reasoning as structural. 
 61. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 182–84. 
 62. Id. at 183. 
 63. BLACK, supra note 1, at 31. “Black is thus protesting not the exclusivity of the textual 
mode so much as the ‘stylistic preference’ by which judges—especially twentieth-century 
judges—have come to employ the reasoning process of textual interpretation over that of 
structural and relational inference.” Blasi, supra note 14, at 180. 
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structures and relationships without expressly delineating any rights 
and powers that flow therefrom.”64 When we move from individual 
rights cases to contested questions about constitutional authority (and 
in particular questions about the allocation of power between the 
central government and the states), Black’s reliance on structural 
features and constitutionally derived institutional relationships may 
hold even greater potential to influence the analytic process. The 
question is what significance the shift away from provisions of grant 
or prohibition might have for the way these issues are framed and 
resolved. 
B.  Concerns About Judicial Discretion 
Structure and Relationship was written during the Warren Court 
era, and Charles Black embraced that Court’s activism expressly.65 
Importantly, however, his activism took a distinct form. While his 
reach in identifying the structures and relationships that might 
qualify as the basis for constitutional decision making was 
reasonably cautious, he was far less restrained in his elaboration of 
the inferences that lead from those foundational structures and 
relationships to the doctrinal outcomes he urged in individual cases. 
This “free-wheeling” and “imaginative” aspect to Black’s 
constitutional analysis,66 both in individual rights cases and in 
disputes regarding the authority of the federal government,67 invited 
a familiar critique, that the adoption of structural reasoning by the 
Court would permit the exercise of “excessive judicial discretion.”68 
 
 64. Blasi, supra note 14, at 182. 
 65. Black described himself as a “judicial activist proudly self-confessed.” BLACK, supra 
note 1, at 72. 
 66. Blasi, supra note 14, at 183. 
 67. A good example of Black’s approach in an individual rights case is his reworking of the 
Court’s rationale in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), which involved a challenge 
to a Nevada tax of a dollar a head on the exit of persons from the state. Black suggested “the fact 
that the United States is a single nation warrants inference as to mobility of population, quite 
aside from strictly governmental needs.” BLACK, supra note 1, at 27–28. He offered an equally 
“free-wheeling” approach to the state action issue presented in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 
651 (1951), by suggesting that Congress constitutionally ought to have the power “to make 
criminal any violent interference, whether by a state or by private persons, with the opinion-
forming process that gives life to the national polity.” BLACK, supra note 1, at 50. 
 68. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 343 (3d ed. 2007); see also Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the 
Structural Method, or How Charles Black Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform 
and Congressional Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833 (2004) (noting the wide judicial discretion created 
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The concern was that the Justices, who were already seen by some to 
be using loose inferential reasoning to rationalize predetermined 
outcomes in controversial cases, would be further liberated to engage 
in even more unrestrained instrumental reasoning once their analyses 
were grounded not by express constitutional text but instead by 
abstract constructions regarding constitutional structure and 
institutional relationship.69 
Black offered several responses to this concern. First, he argued 
that his approach to constitutional reasoning was no less respectful of 
text (and no less liberated from the constraints of text) than the 
inferential reasoning from constitutional provisions of grant or 
prohibition that the Warren Court often deployed, especially with 
respect to constitutional passages of “high generality.”70 Black 
explained that “[t]he question is not whether the text shall be 
respected, but rather how one goes about respecting a text of that 
high generality and consequent ambiguity which marks so many 
crucial constitutional texts.”71 Black’s view was that “the generalities 
and ambiguities are no greater when one applies the method of 
reasoning from structure and relation,”72 precisely because the 
structural principles he proposed as analytic anchors reflect genuine 
commitments embedded in the American constitutional order and not 
transient policy preferences that might ebb or flow with the shifting 
membership and political affiliations of the members of the Court. 
Indeed, some contemporary advocates of Black’s structural method 
have argued that his approach is “perhaps less susceptible to abuse” 
than other more familiar interpretive methods, precisely “because it 
ties the development of new principles to the overall structure and 
purposes of the Constitution.”73 
Moreover, Black asserted that reasoning from constitutional 
structure and relationship could improve the predictability and clarity 
of constitutional doctrine, and serve to introduce a much needed 
 
by structural interpretation); John Harrison, Review of Structure and Relationship in 
Constitutional Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1786 (2003) (book review) (same). 
 69. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 189. 
 70. BLACK, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 71. Id. at 30. 
 72. Id. at 30–31. 
 73. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 26, at 1118 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Glenn H. 
Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1346 (1992)). 
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candor to the Court’s work.74 The Court’s analysis, he suggested, 
likely would be more empirical and pragmatic and less likely to be 
stiffly formalist and removed from the real world interests at stake, if 
the question the Court was given to address was not what a particular 
clause or constitutional phrase might mean to a careful reader (or 
must have meant to one who encountered that text in the late 
eighteenth century), but rather what answer to the legal question 
would make the most sense in light of the larger constitutional 
project. Focusing the Court’s work in this way on the practical 
features of a dispute rather than permitting its attention to be diverted 
to an often acontextual consideration of language or grammar, might 
not diminish uncertainty or drive out doctrinal indeterminacy, but it 
could serve to frame disagreements between the Justices or among 
advocates so that the interests in conflict, and the relative costs of 
selecting one outcome rather than another, would be made more 
apparent and thus more amenable to frank evaluation.75 
In his lectures, Black pressed this point about transparency and 
candor in the course of his discussion of Brewer v. Hoxie School 
District No. 46,76 a case about the possible federal constitutional 
protections that might attach to actions by state officials 
implementing federal rights.77 The facts of the case did not fit neatly 
into any familiar constitutional provision setting out specific powers 
 
 74. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 31–32. 
 75. This transparency may on occasion serve as an ameliorative to the problem noted by 
Alexander Bickel and others of the claimed counter-majoritarian illegitimacy associated with 
constitutional judicial review, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962), because it facilitates other actors in the 
constitutional system to engage the Court’s work, both through related legislative measures and 
executive branch implementation of constitutional norms. Of course, Congress cannot reverse the 
Court’s constitutional decisions by ordinary legislation and the executive branch cannot simply 
ignore the Court’s prescriptions, but by modifying the sub-constitutional context within which 
constitutional doctrine is operationalized, the political branches often can influence the shape and 
direction of the broader constitutional regime. For a good discussion of this interactive process, 
see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 
(1988); see also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). 
On the general idea that the constitutional order operates throughout the various branches and 
levels of government, see GRABER, supra note 60, at 103–04, 121–39 (2013). “The pattern of 
constitutional authority that has resulted from these complex interactions among elected officials, 
political activists, and unelected justices more resembles the chaos of the local garage band than 
the precision of a Mozart symphony.” Id. at 103. 
 76. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956). 
 77. Id. at 91. The plaintiffs in this case were members of a local school board in Hoxie, 
Arkansas who were attempting to implement a policy to desegregate the local public schools. 
They sued in federal district court for injunctive relief against the defendants, who were seeking 
to interfere with the operation of the Hoxie schools on a desegregated basis. Id. at 93–94. 
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or prohibitions, but Professor Black offered a structural rationale for 
the federal appeals court’s holding for the state officials, suggesting 
that the outcome ought to turn on a general understanding of the 
federal-state relationship and not on any specific clause or phrase in 
the constitution.78 Directing his attention to the value of judicial 
candor, Black observed: 
I think this an eminently sensible implication. You may not 
think so. If you do not, then we can and must begin to argue 
at once about the practicalities and proprieties of the thing, 
without getting out dictionaries whose entries will not really 
respond to the question we are putting, or scanning 
utterances, contemporary with the text, of persons who did 
not really face the question we are asking. We will have to 
deal with policy and not with grammar. I am not saying that 
grammar can be sidestepped, or that policy can legitimately 
be the whole of law. I am only saying that where a fairly 
available method of legal reasoning, by its very nature, 
leads directly to the discussion of practical rightness, that 
method should be used whenever possible.79 
Two additional considerations help to shore up Black’s response 
to the critics of his interpretive approach. Neither is expressly set out 
in Structure and Relationship or in Black’s other published work on 
the subject, but both are clearly implied. The first is that the adoption 
of a structural approach, because it tends to reframe constitutional 
disputes into questions about the operation of governmental and 
other societal systems, has the potential to broaden the information 
that litigants are likely to bring to the adjudicative process and to 
broaden the perspective of the judges charged with evaluating the 
resulting claims. As Vince Blasi has explained: “To the extent that 
structural reasoning would result in a refashioning of lawsuits, with 
different information coming to the attention of judges,” the 
approach “may well lead to judicial intuitions and preconceptions 
that can be considered to be more sophisticated and thereby, quite 
apart from the subjective desirability of the results that might ensue, 
improvements of ‘process.’”80 A reliance on specific sections and 
 
 78. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 17–19, 22. 
 79. Id. at 22–23. 
 80. Blasi, supra note 14, at 189–90. Blasi also notes that “the structural approach recognizes 
a much broader, more comprehensive set of constitutional norms,” and thus “may facilitate a 
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clauses of constitutional text concerned with authorizing action or 
limiting authority necessarily pushes courts to evaluate constitutional 
claims in isolation one from another. “The complex, integrated 
injustices of the current age,” however, “do not fit easily into the 
pigeonholes of specific grants and prohibitions” and do not lend 
themselves to effective resolution solely through the elaboration of 
that species of constitutional language.81 
C.  Demonstrating Fidelity to the Written Constitution by Attending 
to Structures and Institutional Relationships 
The final consideration operating in favor of Professor Black’s 
method of reasoning from structure and relationship sounds not as a 
pragmatic ground for adoption of his approach but as a ground based 
in principle, capable of contributing to the overall legitimacy of the 
system of judicial review. At least as conceived by Black, the 
structures and relationships that form the basis for his analysis derive 
in some demonstrable fashion from the “sovereign act of will,” and 
the resulting writing, by which the constitution was established and 
brought into effect through ratification.82 Difficult questions of 
“fidelity” necessarily arise whenever a contemporary approach to 
interpretation seeks some measure of grounding in the original 
founding of the constitutional order. If the obligations and 
prohibitions of the original written Constitution are taken to have 
express, specific, and literal ongoing force, the problem of the “dead 
hand”—the uncertain moral and political authority of a past group of 
decision makers to control the democratic choices of the present—
 
judicial response to citizen complaints that concern systemic shortcomings as well as those that 
involve particularized grievances.” Id. at 186. 
 81. Id. at 187. An article published in the run up to the Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), in which the Court 
evaluated the constitutionality of the “individual mandate” provision of the Affordable Care Act 
of 2010, serves as a helpful example of the kind of information that can become relevant once a 
structural approach to constitutional interpretation is employed, but that might not be regarded by 
the Court as relevant in a more traditional interpretive model. In the article, Professors Leslie 
Meltzer Henry and Maxwell Stearns employ game theory to demonstrate in some detail why a 
state-level approach to regulating the health insurance market is bound to fail and thus why, on an 
incompetence of the individual states rationale, the federal government ought to be empowered to 
intervene in this national market. See Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce 
Games and the Individual Mandate, 100 GEO L.J. 1117 (2012). For additional discussion of 
Sebelius and the Meltzer Henry and Stearns’s article, see infra text accompanying notes 262–64. 
 82. Blasi, supra note 14, at 192; see also RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 11 (reminding that it 
was the Constitution as a whole and not its parts that was presented to the states and that was 
ratified). 
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necessarily must be confronted.83 If, on the other hand, these 
formative commitments are treated not as literal or static, or 
conveyed directly in the Constitution’s passages of grant and 
prohibition, but instead are found more generally in the 
Constitution’s broadly embedded values and institutional 
arrangements, “whose meaning and context evolve over time,”84 then 
constitutional interpretation becomes a task of construction as much 
as discovery, a task that the Founders (and state ratifying 
conventions) can be understood to have delegated to future actors, 
including succeeding generations of judges hearing constitutional 
claims. By this account, constitutional reasoning by inference from 
structure and relationship is neither freed entirely from the 
constraints of the decisions entered at the founding nor burdened 
completely by the literal terms of grant and prohibition contained in 
the original master text. Constitutional meaning is instead an 
amalgam of original design harmonized with ongoing reinvention 
and reinterpretation by contemporary actors operating within a 
constitutional tradition that each generation must remake and 
reauthorize on its own terms.85 To be sure, the constitutional tradition 
in the United States is centered around a written text. From one 
perspective, this fact clearly distinguishes the American 
constitutional order from other constitutional systems based on an 
“unwritten” or “uncodified” constitution.86 In constitutional systems 
without a written text, foundational authority is said to be located 
“not in a spontaneous act of autonomous sovereign will but in a 
living discursive tradition of historical legal thought and practice 
 
 83. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 381–83 (1997). 
 84. Blasi, supra note 14, at 192. 
 85. One version of this dynamic process of constitutional (re)construction is the theory of 
constitutional “translation” suggested by Lawrence Lessig. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in 
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171 n.32 (1993). Jack Balkin’s proposed “method of text 
and principle,” which conceives the task of interpretation as “look[ing] to original meaning and 
underlying principle and decid[ing] how best to apply them in current circumstances,” is also 
applicable. See Balkin, supra note 29, at 293. 
 86. Danchin, supra note 29, at 35. On this account, the U.S. Constitution is “understood to 
be the result of an exceptional act of popular self-determination” and functions as a “master-text 
[that] is the expression of a super-majoritarian act of popular will.” Id. at 37. “We have a sacred 
text—the Constitution—which we understand as the revelatory expression of the popular 
sovereign.” Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the 
New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2000). The role of the judiciary in this text-
centric system, in turn, is “to articulate the meaning of the canonical constitutional master-text 
which is itself a ‘remnant’ of popular sovereignty.” Danchin, supra note 29, at 38. 
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which precedes and shapes acts of sovereign will.”87 Inherent in this 
distinction between written and unwritten constitutions is an 
embedded set of ideas about the normative basis of constitutional 
obligation.88 Written constitutions command fidelity because of their 
origins, while unwritten constitutions have normative force because 
of their past reception and the ongoing engagement of “law-applying 
officials” with that tradition.89 From this point of view, the job of a 
constitutional court in a system with a written constitution is to 
interrogate the written text, perhaps giving special significance to its 
original meaning, so as to effectuate the commitments that the 
sovereign people set at the moment of ratification.90 In a 
constitutional system without a written constitution, by contrast, the 
judicial function is to nurture the “living discursive tradition,” 
essentially facilitating a “partnership among ‘those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who will be born.’”91 
It is possible, however, in considering the American 
constitutional order, to view both the question of constitutional 
normativity (the question of fidelity to an original set of 
constitutional commitments, reflected in a text made by an act of 
sovereign will at the founding) and the question of judicial function 
(the Court’s disposition toward the written text) in a way that 
borrows helpfully from the tradition of unwritten constitutionalism 
and that narrows somewhat the distinction between the operation of a 
written and an unwritten constitution. As Charles Black helpfully 
suggested, the entrenched obligations that derive from an original act 
of sovereign will may be structural and relational as much as they are 
directive and prohibitory.92 The commitments of the founding to 
which ongoing generations owe fidelity are those foundational 
arrangements that have endured and have been embraced, refined, 
and re-enacted over the long life of the constitutional regime. In that 
sense, the normative force of the written constitution, including the 
institutions and structures woven into its whole text, derives from its 
 
 87. Danchin, supra note 29, at 36. 
 88. For one influential view of the relationship between written and unwritten constitutional 
authority, see Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
211 (1988). 
 89. Danchin, supra note 29, at 49. 
 90. Id. at 51. 
 91. Id. at 36. 
 92. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
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original history together with its long and useful tenure.93 It is, as 
with the unwritten British constitution, a “partnership among ‘those 
who are living, those who are dead, and those who will be born.’”94 
The judicial function under a written constitution, then, need not be 
narrowly hermeneutical. Charles Black’s work on structure and 
relationship is not a repudiation of the importance of constitutional 
text, but a call to refocus the interpretive task to engage the text more 
holistically and to redirect the Court’s attention from narrow 
provisions of grant and prohibition to a broader consideration, when 
appropriate, of the Constitution’s foundational structuring 
language.95 
PART II 
A.  The Constitutional Convention and the Question of Federalism 
When the delegates to the Constitutional Convention arrived in 
Philadelphia in the early summer of 1787, they faced a threshold 
question, how to designate the essential character and authority of 
the central government relative to the states. One possibility was to 
depart substantially from the design of the Articles of Confederation 
and adopt a scheme in which the states would be reduced to “the 
position of municipal corporations confined to the area of local self-
government” while the legislature of the central government would 
be authorized to exercise general lawmaking powers.96 Alexander 
Hamilton apparently favored this position, although his plan was 
never formally presented to the body.97 A somewhat more measured 
version was prepared by Edmund Randolph, James Madison, and 
others in the Virginia delegation.98 This Virginia Plan framed early 
discussion in the Convention and set the agenda for much of the 
participants’ work.99 
On the other side were proposals to retain a confederation of 
relatively powerful quasi-sovereign states, but to identify specific 
 
 93. Danchin, supra note 29, at 36. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See BLACK, supra note 1. 
 96. Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in 
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 432 (1941). 
 97. See id. at 433. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 433, 436–37. 
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new powers, beyond those recognized in the Articles, to be given the 
central government in order to respond directly to the perceived 
failings of the then-existing arrangements.100 Under these proposals, 
the states would be designated as “constituent members of a federal 
system,” and the central government’s power, although augmented in 
expressly designated areas, would remain significantly circumscribed 
in most others.101 Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and William 
Paterson of New Jersey offered proposals that reflected this 
perspective.102 Paterson’s plan was given careful consideration by 
the Delegates, but was not adopted.103 
At the heart of the constitutional system that ultimately emerged 
from the work of the Convention is a central government of limited 
but superior authority and individual states designated as repositories 
of residual authority. Notwithstanding the relative clarity of these 
essential structural features, a good deal of uncertainty attended (and 
continues to attend) the task of determining how to delineate the 
boundaries of the federal government’s superior authority (and of 
determining whether and to what extent that authority should be 
exclusive or concurrently shared with the states). The historical 
record shows that the delegates’ deliberations occurred in several 
discrete stages. First, proceeding as a “committee of the whole” they 
worked through a series of proposals, including those contained in 
the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan, to determine which to 
retain on their agenda for more formal action by the Convention.104 
Next, the delegates returned systematically to the items they had 
approved as a committee of the whole, entertaining amendments and 
revisions, for the purpose of determining the measures they wished 
to forward to a “committee of detail.”105 Finally, following a return 
 
 100. See id. at 433–34. Edmund Randolph offered the Convention a catalogue of the primary 
defects the country had experienced under the Articles of Confederation. They included, among 
others: “that the confederation produced no security against foreign invasion”; “that the federal 
government could not check the quarrels between states”; and “that the federal government could 
not defend itself against the incroachments from the states.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1]. 
 101. Abel, supra note 96, at 433. 
 102. See id. at 433, 434–35; see also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, 
supra note 100, at 242. 
 103. See Abel, supra note 96, at 437; see also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 33. 
 104. See Abel, supra note 96, at 436–37. 
 105. See id. at 437. 
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by the committee of detail later in the summer of 1787, the 
Convention debated that group’s working draft and, with 
amendments and substitutions, finally approved the version of the 
constitution that was presented for ratification.106 At each of these 
stages of the decision-making process, the record makes clear that 
some delegates favored a broad delegation of power to the central 
government (the position initially set out in the Virginia Plan) and 
others supported strictly enumerated limits on that authority (the 
view of Paterson and Pinckney). There are also formal markers 
indicating where the weight of opinion on this question stood at each 
critical juncture in the process.107 These data points are difficult to 
align into a simple narrative in favor of one of the competing 
positions or the other; instead, they suggest a more complicated story 
about how to understand the nature of the federalist system that 
emerged from this process. 
i.  Conceptual Framing by the Committee of the Whole and the 
Convention Prior to the Referral to the Committee of Detail 
The initial deliberations of the committee of the whole, which 
commenced on May 29, 1787, were organized around the Virginia 
Plan, presented to the Convention by Edmund Randolph.108 On the 
question of the lawmaking authority of the central government, the 
Virginians’ proposal was that 
the National Legislature ought to be [e]mpowered to enjoy 
the [l]egislative [r]ights vested in Congress by the 
Confederation [and] moreover to legislate in all cases to 
which the separate [s]tates are incompetent, or in which the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
exercise of individual Legislation . . . .109 
According to Madison’s Notes,110 several delegates from South 
Carolina (Pinckney, Rutledge, and Butler) raised objections to the 
 
 106. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2, supra note 22, at 176–89. 
 107. See Abel, supra note 96, at 436–38. 
 108. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 18–23 
(Madison’s Notes). 
 109. Id. at 21. 
 110. In her book Madison’s Hand, Mary Sarah Bilder describes how Madison revised his 
Notes in the years following the Convention by making substantial revisions, additions, and 
deletions to the text. Bilder’s work reminds us that Madison’s Notes reflect not simply his 
impressions at the Convention but also his evolving perspective on the work of the founding over 
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“vagueness” of the individual state incompetence standard for 
delineating federal lawmaking power and suggested that they could 
not support it “until they should see an exact enumeration of the 
powers comprehended by this definition.”111 Madison expressed a 
“bias in favor of an enemeration [sic]” but also identified “doubts 
concerning its practicability.”112 Randolph “disclaimed any intention 
to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature,” 
notwithstanding the articulation of a state incompetence standard 
rather than a precise enumeration of federal legislative powers.113 
After considerable discussion, on May 31, 1787, the committee of 
the whole, voting by state, determined to advance the state 
incompetence formulation for further action by the Convention.114 
The vote was nine states in favor, one state (Connecticut) divided, 
and none opposed.115 The committee of the whole also voted, in this 
case unanimously, in favor of the additional provision in the Virginia 
Plan that would empower the national legislature to act when “the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual Legislation.”116 
In mid-June of 1787, the committee of the whole, having 
completed its initial favorable review of the Virginia Plan, turned its 
attention to the alternative proposals that had been prepared by 
William Paterson of New Jersey, apparently in consultation with 
delegates from several other smaller states.117 After extensive 
discussions, the delegates rejected the New Jersey plan, “adhering to 
that of Randolph as the foundation for further action.”118 By mid-
July, the delegates had reached the second stage of their process, in 
which they were now proceeding as a “convention as such.”119 The 
focus at this stage was to consider the proposals that the committee 
of the whole had placed on the agenda, for approval by the 
 
time. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 49 (2015). 
 111. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 53. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 53–54. 
 115. Id. at 47. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Abel, supra note 96, at 437. 
 118. Id.; see also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 
313. 
 119. Abel, supra note 96, at 437. 
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Convention and consequent referral to a committee of detail.120 
When the discussion turned to the powers of the national legislature, 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut offered substitute language for that 
which had been approved in May by the committee of the whole.121 
Sherman suggested that the legislature of the central government 
ought to be empowered “in all cases which may concern the common 
interests of the Union; but not to interfere with the [g]overnment of 
the individual [s]tates in any matters of internal police . . . wherein 
the [g]eneral welfare of the U[nited] States is not concerned.”122 This 
proposal was rejected by a vote of eight states to two,123 and, on 
July 17, 1787, the Convention formally approved language, 
submitted by Gunning Bedford of Delaware, conferring on the new 
federal Congress legislative powers “in all cases for the general 
interest of the Union, and also in those to which the states are 
separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the U[nited] 
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
[l]egislation.”124 The vote, again, was eight states in favor and two 
opposed.125 
ii.  The Committee of Detail’s Enumerations Approach 
On July 24, 1787, the Convention delegated to a “committee of 
detail” the task of developing a draft document “conformable to the 
Resolutions passed by the Convention.”126 In early August of that 
year, the committee of detail returned a “report” which included an 
enumeration of powers to be accorded the new legislature of the 
federal government.127 This enumeration, as modified and 
renumbered, formed the basis for Article I, Section 8 of the final 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2, supra note 22, at 25. 
 123. See id. at 26. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 27; see Abel, supra note 96, at 435–36. The debate between proponents of a 
broad state incompetence formula and those who supported a more restrictive allocation of 
authority to the central government intersected a second debate, between delegates from the 
larger states who favored using population to determine representation in the legislature and those 
from smaller states who sought equal representation. In July of 1787, after the delegates had 
settled on a compromise under which there would be equal representation in the Senate, some 
delegates from smaller states, notably including Bedford of Delaware, turned their support in 
favor of the broad state incompetence approach, while others from larger states, including 
Randolph, cooled on the idea. 
 126. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2, supra note 22, at 106. 
 127. See id. at 181–82. 
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version of the constitution approved by the Convention and 
ultimately ratified by the requisite number of state conventions. 
Significantly, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 provides that Congress 
shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”128 Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 18 states that Congress shall have the power 
“[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”129 
A leading constitutional law casebook has framed discussion of 
this history in the following way: 
It is evident . . . that questions of large import are presented 
by the shift from a general and loosely-phrased grant of 
power to the national government, which the Convention 
initially approved on May 31 and July 17, to the itemized 
list of national powers embodied in the August 6 report of 
the Committee of Detail. Consideration should be given to 
two conflicting interpretations: (a) The enumeration by the 
Committee of Detail, which the Convention employed as a 
basis for final action, should be construed to reach towards 
the same generalized grant of power to the national 
government which the Convention had earlier approved; (b) 
The decision to enumerate the powers of Congress reflects a 
decision sharply to circumscribe national power.130 
Not infrequently, these “two conflicting interpretations” have 
been identified by justices on the Supreme Court, in majority 
opinions and dissents, as the framework within which to think 
through federalism questions, and in particular questions about the 
reach of the Interstate Commerce power held by Congress.131 On one 
side are Commerce Clause opinions from the late nineteenth century 
through the mid-1930s, as well as significant decisions from United 
 
 128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 129. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 130. VARAT & AMAR, supra note 25, at 107. 
 131. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (highlighting the 
contrasting positions taken in the controlling opinion of Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Ginsburg). For further discussion of these distinct positions, see infra text 
accompanying notes 243–63. 
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States v. Lopez132 forward, in which the Court’s majority has relied 
on a variety of formalist interpretations of the enumerative language 
in Article I, Section 8 to provide strict judicially enforceable 
limitations on the ability of Congress to regulate matters traditionally 
regarded as within the warrant of the states’ police powers.133 On the 
other side is an unbroken string of Commerce Clause decisions from 
the late 1930s until the mid-1990s, as well as forceful dissents in 
more recent cases, in which the justices adopted a practical, 
pragmatic approach to the question of federal powers, relying not on 
the literal terms of the enumeration but rather on an updated version 
of the Virginia Plan’s notion that Congress should be free to 
intervene in all matters about which “the States are separately 
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be 
interrupted.”134 
iii.  Reconciling the Competing Narratives 
While understanding the promulgation history of the Commerce 
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the other provisions in 
Article I, Section 8 within the framework of these two competing 
narratives—two narratives that also appear to mark out the wavering 
and uncertain path of the Supreme Court’s federalism 
 
 132. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 133. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez contains a good overview of this history. 
See id. at 568–73. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court misapplied 
earlier cases involving the constitutionality of state laws, see, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 
20 (1888), to support a formalist distinction between productive activities such as manufacture, 
agriculture, and mining and commercial activities subject to Commerce Clause authority. In this 
period prior to the Court Packing Plan, the Supreme Court also deployed a formalist direct-
indirect test to limit federal regulatory authority. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 
309–10 (1936). In Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court’s 
majority revived this formalist tradition by drawing a distinction between economic and 
noneconomic activities and by reinventing the direct-indirect test as a causation requirement that 
prohibits Congress from “pil[ing] inference upon inference” in order to show that a regulated 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 134. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 1, supra note 100, at 21; see, e.g., 
Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (“In view of 
respondent’s far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. . . . 
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the 
question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum.”); see also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (recognizing the incapacity of individual states to manage because of 
a regulatory race to the bottom); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (recognizing the 
practical empirical effects of home-grown commodities on the vitality of national markets). A 
similar anti-formalist approach is apparent in dissenting opinions in more recent Commerce 
Clause cases. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 641–43, 655 (Souter, J., dissenting); Sebelius, 567 
U.S. at 589, 601–04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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jurisprudence—is sensible, a closer look at the work of the 
Convention history suggests a third slight variation instead. This 
alternative perspective, in turn, invites a reconsideration of Charles 
Black’s method of reasoning from structure and relationship in the 
context of Commerce Clause disputes and other federalism matters, 
by placing the Constitution’s narrow textual passages of grant and 
prohibition into an analytic context that brings into view the broader 
commitments embedded in the whole Constitution. 
Albert Abel, a constitutional law scholar writing in the early 
1940s, offered a helpful account of the decision-making process by 
which the delegates to the Constitutional Convention moved from 
approval of a broad state incompetence standard to adoption of the 
enumerations approach that found its way into the final document.135 
Crucially, after consulting the available historical evidence in 
considerable detail, Abel concluded that the decision of the delegates 
to adopt a version of the itemized list of powers developed by the 
committee of detail did not represent a shift from, or repudiation of, 
their earlier endorsement of a broad standard for federal legislative 
authority, nor was their adoption of the enumerations language 
intended simply to be absorbed into that previously approved 
standard.136 Rather, their intention was to describe the boundaries of 
the newly reconceived central government “within the double 
limitation of standard and item.”137 The “standard” embraced by the 
Convention delegates (avoiding state incompetence and promoting 
the harmony of the United States) and the “items” approach they 
endorsed (the enumerations set out in Article I, Section 8) each 
performed a distinct function in the design of the constitutional order 
they devised. 
For Abel’s account to be coherent, we must understand 
constitutional text to operate at two levels. The individual passages 
of grant and prohibition, including most importantly, the enumerated 
powers of the federal legislature set out in Article 1, Section 8, do 
 
 135. See Abel, supra note 96, at 438–40. 
 136. Id. at 438 (noting that the delegates “had twice approved” the state incompetence 
standard, “once as a committee of the whole and once as a convention” and had rejected twice, 
“once tacitly, in ignoring the Pinckney plan, and again expressly, in their disposition of the 
Patterson proposals,” a straightforward enumerations approach “unaccompanied by a declaration 
of standards appropriate for the determination of their scope and reach”). 
 137. Id. at 440 (“The sense of the convention seems clear enough. The evident purpose was to 
give power over neither a congeries of independent unrelated subjects, nor yet over some misty 
and uncertain area of undefined extent . . . .”). 
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important work in conveying the Convention’s understanding of the 
role they expected Congress to play in the newly revised federalist 
system.138 But the broader sweep of constitutional text, including 
provisions creating the very institutions of the central government, 
providing for the election of incumbents in the political branches and 
the selection of judicial officers for the federal courts, situating these 
institutions one to another and to their coordinate partners in the 
governments of the states—the textual sources from which Professor 
Black derived the foundations for his reasoning from structure and 
relationship—also play a key role in shaping American constitutional 
federalism.139 In essence, the delegates likely understood that their 
early work operating as a committee of the whole, and their 
somewhat later deliberations prior to their referral to the committee 
of detail, was the work of conceptual framing, of creating the 
constitutional structures and relationships that would serve to ground 
later, more specific efforts, reflected in other more directive 
provisions of grant and prohibition.140 In late May through mid-July 
of 1787, the Convention participants were building the foundations 
and framing out the structure of the constitutional house they were 
building.141 The work of the committee of detail and its subsequent 
adoption by the Convention later that summer was, in effect, the 
application of bricks and shingles onto the structure to which they 
had already committed themselves, not its repudiation.142 
The creation of essential structures and relationships, conveyed 
by the broad sweep of constitutional language, was the Convention’s 
effort to embed permanently the fundamental values and 
commitments that support the American constitutional order. The 
enumeration of powers in Article I, derived from the report of the 
committee of detail, as well as the articulation of other provisions of 
grant and prohibition elsewhere in the document, represented the 
delegates’ best understanding of how those fundamental 
 
 138. See id. at 439. 
 139. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: The Myth and Reality of Federalism, 9 
UNIV. TOL. L. REV. 615, 617 (1978) (discussing that the unique allocation of power between the 
federal government and the states means that “American federalism is non-exportable”); Charles 
L. Black, Jr., On Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 469, 470 (1984) 
(discussing the worry that government powers have become too broad). 
 140. See Abel, supra note 96, at 439; see also RAKOVE, supra note 15. 
 141. Abel, supra note 96, at 436–37. 
 142. See id. at 439–40. 
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commitments would be operationalized for the then-foreseeable 
future.143 There is good reason to treat as legitimate the fundamental 
values—the commitment to institutional arrangement and to essential 
constitutional structure—that the Framers put in place at the 
Convention. Those values and institutional arrangements have 
largely endured over the many decades of our constitutional history 
and have been embraced by succeeding generations.144 Some of the 
more specific provisions of grant and prohibition have also worn 
well over time and thus remain vibrant markers for purposes of 
constitutional decision making today.145 But others clearly have 
fallen out of alignment with the underlying economic, social, 
cultural, and political context within which the Constitution must 
operate. In those instances, the deeper structures and relationships 
that ground constitutional practice should predominate and the 
precise textual mandate of the individual constitutional passages that 
no longer fit the needs of the polity should not. 
B.  The Interstate Commerce Clause and the Framers’ 
Miscalculation 
Importantly, the Interstate Commerce Clause,146 the enumerated 
power that has proven the most fertile source of federal government 
power over the years, may be the best example of an individual 
provision of grant and prohibition whose original conception is most 
divergent from contemporary understandings and from the needs of 
contemporary society and twenty-first century economic realities. 
Once again, Professor Abel’s canvassing of the historical record 
provides a rich picture of the intentions and expectations of the 
 
 143. See id. 
 144. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1067–69 
(1981) (“Judges, or others who wish to appeal to the Constitution, must demonstrate that the 
principles upon which they propose to confer constitutional status express values that our society 
does hold to be fundamental. One way in which that can be done is by showing that those values 
are rooted in history, that they are not merely the result of the interests or passions of the 
moment.”); cf. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF 
GOVERNMENT (2001) (arguing that a constitution is the institution by which a people holds itself 
to its fundamental political commitments over time). But see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE 
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) (presenting a sustained argument that essential constitutional 
structures and institutional arrangements have proven dysfunctional and should be replaced). 
 145. Some examples include the Foreign Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3., the 
provision governing the creation of federal bankruptcy law, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4., and the 
provision creating the basis for intellectual property law, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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delegates to the Convention of 1787 with respect to the enumerated 
power to regulate commerce “among the several states,” and 
demonstrates how far removed from that original understanding we 
find ourselves today.147 That the original conception of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause is so far removed from our contemporary reality is 
reason enough to relax reliance on that specific text as the basis for 
determining federal regulatory powers now and in the foreseeable 
future and instead to consult Professor Black’s reasoning from 
structure and relationship as a superior methodology for making 
federalism decisions. On this question of assigning domestic 
regulatory authority to the federal government, the Framers’ 
expectations have not been borne out by subsequent developments. 
But their broader foundational work, reflected in essential 
constitutional structures and relationships, remains relevant to the 
task, and indeed provides the basis for ongoing development in this 
area. 
The Framers clearly did not expect the Interstate Commerce 
Clause to be a general source of legislative authority governing 
economic activity within and between the states.148 Instead, they 
intended this provision to serve merely a “negative and preventive” 
function, to limit the effects of commercial competition between the 
states.149 By contrast, the delegates to the Convention envisioned the 
Foreign Commerce Clause as potentially a broad grant of affirmative 
power to the new national legislature, and expected that this 
enumerated power would support significant regulatory activity.150 
Abel points out that, unlike the regulation of foreign commerce, 
which was debated at length by the delegates, control by the central 
government over commercial activity between the states “seems to 
have been mentioned only nine times” during the Convention’s 
formal deliberations.151 More importantly, on all nine of these 
occasions, the delegates’ focus was on ensuring that the new national 
legislature would be able to enact measures to prevent or ameliorate 
the obstructive effects of state regulations, tariffs, or exactions on 
 
 147. See Abel, supra note 96, at 465–81. 
 148. See id. at 472. 
 149. Id. at 469 (quoting Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)). 
 150. See id. at 468–69. 
 151. Id. at 470. 
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commerce across state lines.152 Not once was the “grant of power 
over commerce between the states . . . advanced as the basis for 
independent affirmative regulation by the federal government.”153 
Indeed, while modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence treats the 
regulation of “instrumentalities” of domestic commerce as a 
quintessential subject matter for federal government regulation,154 
the Framers’ discussions regarding the development (and protection) 
of internal waterways, harbors, roads, bridges, and the like 
“uniformly assumed that control over such transportation facilities 
was to remain with the states, and not to be devolved upon the 
general government. No more was claimed for the commerce clause 
than that it might prevent states through which interstate streams ran 
from levying toll for their use.”155 
The Framers’ intention, that the Interstate Commerce Clause 
would play a “purely negative function of vetoing state-imposed 
barriers . . . to interstate trade,” and that it was at best a provision 
ancillary to the Foreign Commerce power, fairly quickly proved to 
be a miscalculation.156 This miscalculation inhered principally in the 
inability of the original parsimonious conception of the domestic 
commerce power to accomplish the broader goal the Framers also 
had adopted, which was to empower the central government to 
promote the harmony of the Union by legislating when the states 
individually were incompetent. In a series of decisions from Gibbons 
v. Ogden157 forward, the Supreme Court reconceived the Interstate 
Commerce Clause to provide a range of affirmative legislative 
powers to the federal government.158 Of course, the scope of this 
judicial reworking has been subject to considerable dispute from the 
 
 152. See id. at 470–71. 
 153. See id. at 471. As further evidence of the extremely limited scope that the delegates 
imagined for the Interstate Commerce Clause, Abel notes that most matters affecting the flow of 
commerce between the states were debated in isolation from the Commerce Clause and generally 
were made subject to separate provisions in the constitutional text. Thus, Congress was separately 
given the power to coin money and to punish counterfeiting, and independent provisions were 
directed toward prohibiting the impairment of contract by states and providing a federal judicial 
forum for inter-state commercial disputes by way of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 476–78. 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
 155. Abel, supra note 96, at 478. 
 156. Id. at 480–81. 
 157. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 158. Abel, supra note 96, at 480 (“For the first thirty years of its life the commerce clause was 
lost in silence, and since then it has been lost in words. It has not been missed, however, for the 
courts have supplied a fine large substitute; whereas the original now turns out to have been so 
small that it was naturally hard to keep track of.”). 
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very start and remains a source of vexatious contest moving 
forward.159 But overhanging this judicial project of reconstruction 
has been a broad constitutional commitment to ensuring that the 
federal government is equipped to manage challenges of public 
policy that are beyond the ken of the states when acting in their 
individual capacities. The methodological point put by Charles Black 
in his White Lectures goes to the persistence of this broad 
constitutional commitment, embedded in the constitution’s essential 
structures and relationships.160 In Black’s account, significant 
advantages, in achieving doctrinal clarity and candor, are available 
when the interpretive project is centered not on constitutional 
provisions of grant and prohibition that are misaligned with 
America’s fundamental constitutional structures and relationships, 
but on those structures and relationships themselves.161 
PART III 
If the Supreme Court were to take up Professor Black’s 
invitation to consider reasoning from structure and relationship in at 
least some disputes involving federal authority, and if lower federal 
courts and state courts followed that lead, the importance assigned to 
the highly stylized parsing of narrow constitutional text would 
diminish.162 Disagreements over what constitutes “commerce” (or 
“economic activity”), for example, could be deemphasized in favor 
of more productive deliberations over the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of relying on federal interventions to address difficult 
problems of public concern, particularly when those problems 
 
 159. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 160. See generally BLACK, supra note 1. 
 161. Id. at 22–23. 
 162. Blasi, supra note 14, at 183 (noting that it is important to emphasize that Black’s method 
of reasoning contemplates a role for textual analysis and was intended “as a supplement to, not as 
a substitute for, the dominant technique of textual interpretation”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 61–63. Given the economic consequences of virtually all activity potentially 
subject to federal regulation, however, a commerce clause jurisprudence reliant primarily on the 
close parsing of terms such as “commerce” and “economic activity” is not likely to be effective in 
delineating the boundaries of the federalist system. In the case of the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
the logic of Professor Black’s approach pushes toward a consideration of the broader structural 
components of the written constitution and away from narrow bits of text derived from the 
specific enumerated power. 
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present intractable coordination difficulties for individual states.163 
Under a judicial regime that seriously entertained Black’s method of 
constitutional interpretation, legitimate disagreements about how 
best to calibrate the balance of American federalism would be more 
transparently addressed, and proxy fights waged through stylized 
arguments over narrow text could be avoided.164 
In addition, adoption of Black’s interpretive method would 
significantly recast the Court’s treatment of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. On occasion, the Court has relied on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause as a tool for extending the legislative authority of 
Congress beyond the boundaries thought to be set by the enumerated 
powers that precede it.165 The Justices in these cases treat the 
Necessary and Proper Clause as “granting” powers to Congress 
beyond those conveyed by the other enumerated provisions.166 On 
 
 163. On the Commerce Clause and problems of state coordination, see Maxwell L. Stearns, 
Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (2020) [hereinafter 
Conflicting Premises] and Maxwell L. Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game 
Theoretical Perspective, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Game Theoretical Perspective]. 
In his dissent in Morrison, Justice Breyer observes that “[w]e live in a Nation knit together by 
two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental change. Those changes, 
taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can 
affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the State—at least when considered in the aggregate. 
And that fact makes it close to impossible for courts to develop meaningful subject-matter 
categories . . . .” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 660 (citation omitted). 
 164. This perspective is consistent with Hamilton’s position in Federalist 23 and 31. See THE 
FEDERALIST NOS. 23, 31, at 123–26, 165–68 (Alexander Hamilton). In Federalist 23, for 
example, Hamilton asserts: 
[T]he adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention would have given a better 
impression of their candor if they had confined themselves to showing that the internal 
structure of the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy of the 
confidence of the people. They ought not to have wandered into inflammatory 
declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the powers. 
Id. at 126. 
In Federalist 31, Hamilton concludes his discussion by observing; 
[I]t is by far the safest course to . . . confine our attention wholly to the nature and 
extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Everything beyond this 
must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the 
scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped will always take care to preserve the 
constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments. 
Id. at 168. 
 165. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (explaining that Congress has 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to prevent public corruption that undermines its 
exercise of authority under the Spending Clause). 
 166. See id.; see also United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2010) (“[T]he 
Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal 
legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or 
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”). 
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the other side, some of the Justices have looked to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as the textual basis for limiting Congressional 
undertakings, particularly by holding that the challenged legislation 
is not “proper.”167 Taken together, these cases, some pushing in favor 
and some against Congressional authority, have prompted a renewed 
academic discussion about how to properly interpret the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.168 
A.  The New Structuralism and the Renewed Debate Over the 
Necessary and Proper Clause 
Professor John Manning, in his 2014 Harvard Law Review 
Foreword, has characterized the reasoning of the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts with respect to the Necessary and Proper Clause as a 
“new structuralism,” and has linked this contemporary form of 
structuralism to the interpretive approach set out in Charles Black’s 
work.169 While an accurate account of the current Court’s cases, this 
is a misreading of Black. 
On one hand, Manning argues that the post-New Deal Supreme 
Court “treated the Necessary and Proper Clause as a broad source of 
congressional authority,” and consequently accorded significant 
deference to Congressional decisions.170 By contrast, he understands 
the new structuralism of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts to have 
“transform[ed] the Necessary and Proper Clause into a delegation of 
power to the courts to define abstract structural policies.”171 Manning 
is troubled by this interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
which he regards instead as a “master provision” directed 
specifically to Congress and conveying a clear delegation of 
discretion to that body “to compose the government and prescribe the 
means of constitutional power.”172 
 
 167. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997); see also Gary Lawson & 
Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the 
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297–333 (1993) (urging the Court to read federalism limits 
into the term “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause); Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow 
Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2068–81 (2014) (observing that the Court has used the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in some recent cases to limit Congress’s power). 
 168. See Baude, supra note 11; Beck, supra note 4, Barnett, supra note 4; Manning, supra 
note 13. 
 169. Manning, supra note 11, at 30–32. 
 170. Id. at 6. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 6–7. 
(6) 54.3_BOLDT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/21  2:36 PM 
712 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:675 
Professor Black’s method of reasoning from structure and 
relationship, while consistent with the post-New Deal Court’s 
approach in cases involving federal power, has less to do with the 
new structuralism of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Cases 
purporting to use structural reasoning to support an expansion of 
state sovereign immunity under (or through) the Eleventh 
Amendment,173 or limiting efforts at cooperative federalism on Tenth 
Amendment “anti-commandeering” grounds,174 are not consistent 
with Black’s approach because they do not identify grounds for 
decision that derive fundamentally from constitutional text. In the 
case of state sovereign immunity, the Court’s majority has claimed 
reliance on a principle said to pre-exist the 1787 constitution,175 
whereas the anti-commandeering rationale is linked to particular 
notions of electoral transparency.176 There may be a story to tell that 
could connect these rationales to essential constitutional structures or 
basic institutional relationships central to our constitutional 
system,177 but none of these cases provides that grounding and none 
 
 173. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 728–29 (1999). 
 174. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997). 
 175. The Court’s analysis in Seminole Tribe and Alden v. Maine considers, in addition to the 
original, unamended constitution, the text of the Eleventh Amendment, the text of the Court’s 
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), and the text of its decision in Hans 
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). None of these texts, however, is claimed as the basis for the 
sovereign immunity the Court recognizes. Instead, the Court concludes that the states’ immunity 
from suit “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the 
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (emphasis 
added). Essentially, following the logic of Hans, the Court’s majority in Seminole Tribe explained 
that this sovereign immunity exceeds the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment, because 
that constitutional text was intended merely to correct the error the Court committed in Chisholm 
by permitting diversity suits against a state in federal court. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69. 
 176. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168–69 (“[W]here the Federal Government 
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to 
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local 
electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”). 
 177. In his majority opinion in Printz, Justice Scalia acknowledged that “there is no 
constitutional text speaking to the precise question whether congressional action compelling state 
officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.” Printz, 521 U.S at 898, 905. Instead, he 
explained, “the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge must be sought in historical understanding and 
practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.” Id. When he 
turned to structural reasoning, however, Justice Scalia’s argument was focused on grounding a 
theory of residual state sovereignty generally rather than the anti-commandeering principle more 
particularly. In his discussion of state sovereignty, Justice Scalia drew from a variety of 
constitutional provisions, including some that go beyond grant and prohibition. Thus, he asserted 
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identifies with sufficient precision the textual basis for claiming 
those foundations.178 
 
that, in ratifying the constitution, the states retained a “residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” id. 
at 919, that is 
reflected throughout the Constitution’s text, Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 
(1869); Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), including (to mention only a few 
examples) the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s 
territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the “Citizens” of the States; the 
amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of three-fourths of the States 
to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, which “presupposes 
the continued existence of the states and . . . those means and instrumentalities which 
are the creation of their sovereign and reserved rights,” Helvering v. Gerhardt, 
304 U.S. 405, 414–415 (1938). Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, 
in the Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only 
discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was rendered express by the 
Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” 
Id. (omission and alteration in original). By contrast, the anti-commandeering principle that 
Justice Scalia derived from this theory of residual sovereignty is not similarly grounded in 
structural reasoning tied to constitutional text. Instead, Justice Scalia, like Justice O’Connor in 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 163–66, supported the anti-commandeering prohibition by 
historical arguments about the Framers’ preference for the Virginia Plan over the New Jersey 
Plan and by conclusory assertions as to attributes he assigned to the notion of state sovereignty. 
Printz, 521 U.S at 918–22. Fundamental to residual state sovereignty, he explained, is the 
“[p]reservation of the States as independent and autonomous political entities.” Id. at 928. The 
difficulty, of course, is that none of the provisions that Justice Scalia employed as the basis for 
finding retained state sovereignty necessarily leads to the further conclusion that the States are 
properly understood as fully independent and autonomous entities, let alone that they cannot be 
required in some circumstances to assist in the deployment of federal undertakings. Indeed, as 
Justice Story pointed out in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the 
independence and autonomy of the states as political entities was limited from the start, in Article 
I, section 10 and elsewhere in the Constitution. Story thus notes that the Constitution “is crowded 
with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the states in some of the highest 
branches of their prerogatives.” Id. at 343. One reasonably could take the view that the 
sovereignty retained by the states includes the power of their respective legislatures to consider 
and pass on policy initiatives favored by the central government, which is the feature of 
independence and autonomy at issue in New York v. United States, and one might seek to build a 
case that residual state sovereignty even includes ministerial executive branch functions like those 
challenged in Printz. But the Court’s majorities in both cases, adverting to a theory of electoral 
transparency espoused by academic commentators, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 
168–169 (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61–62 (1988); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political 
Accountability in the National Political Process—The Alternative to Judicial Review of 
Federalism Issues, 80 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 577, 639–65 (1985)), simply fail to demonstrate that 
such powers necessarily are grounded in the essential structures and relationships created by the 
text of the Constitution. 
 178. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.” Id. This text does bar some suits arguably within the original 
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The majority opinions in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida179 
and Alden v. Maine,180 for example, do offer a story about the 
foundations of state sovereign immunity, but it is not an account that 
relies on constitutional text, considered either narrowly or 
holistically. Once the majority in Seminole Tribe and Alden conceded 
that broad sovereign immunity is not conferred by the Eleventh 
Amendment, they had only the pre-Eleventh Amendment 
constitution and pre-constitutional English legal history with which 
to work. But they did not read such immunity in the text of the 
original constitution either; rather, they read it in the Constitution’s 
English history and its subsequent judicial interpretation.181 
Moreover, the story the Court tells gets wrong the English 
history on which it depends. The Alden Court explained that 
“essential principles of federalism” dictate that the “Congress treat 
the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary 
sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”182 
The Framers, they claimed, “thought it ‘neither becoming nor 
convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with that 
large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the 
United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer the 
complaints of private persons.’”183 This notion, that the Framers 
intended the states to be invested with sovereign immunity, in turn 
derives from a presumption that the Framers were applying essential 
principles of English common law and political theory.184 
 
grant of federal judicial power, which “extend[s] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
[the] Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States” as well as “to Controversies . . . between a 
State and Citizens of another State,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, but leaves intact federal judicial 
power premised on a federal question. In order to find immunity from suit in cases falling within 
the arising under jurisdiction of the federal courts, the majority in Seminole Tribe and Alden, 
therefore, were forced to draw from outside the text of the Constitution itself. “To rest on the 
words of the Amendment alone,” they warned, “would be to engage in [a] type of ahistorical 
literalism,” which has been rightly “rejected.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 730. Thus, the Seminole Tribe 
majority asserted that “the Eleventh Amendment reflects ‘the fundamental principle of sovereign 
immunity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority in Article III.’” 517 U.S. at 64 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97–98 (1984)), but 
does not expressly confer that protection from suit. “[T]he sovereign immunity of the States,” the 
Alden majority explained, “neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh 
Amendment.” 527 U.S. at 713. 
 179. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 180. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 181. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69; Alden, 527 U.S. at 748. 
 182. 527 U.S. at 748. 
 183. Id. (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)). 
 184. See id. at 733, 748. 
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In the English tradition, sovereign dignity belonged, of political, 
social, and legal necessity, to the person of the sovereign. According 
to Blackstone, sovereignty grounded the king’s prerogative, the 
bundle of rights that the king alone possessed.185 Significantly, 
however, the awful dignity of the king had two aspects: magisterial 
and servile.186 The former, the Seminole Tribe and Alden majorities 
translate from king to republican state; the latter, they ignore. To the 
extent that the magisterial aspect of sovereign dignity exalts the king, 
its inseparable servile aspect limits him. Indeed, the restriction 
justifies the king’s exaltation. The law exalts the king (and by 
extension republican states) above all others only if, and so far as, the 
king submits to the law. “The principal duty of the king,” says 
Blackstone, “is, to govern his people according to law. . . . And 
this . . . has always been esteemed an express part of the common 
law of England, even when prerogative was at the highest.”187 
Therefore, when the king has done what he is not allowed to do, 
when he has broken the law and injured any of his subjects, 
sovereign dignity obligates him to waive his immunity from suit, so 
that the injury may be redressed (and his sovereign dignity restored). 
The Supreme Court’s half-translation of sovereign dignity from 
monarch to republican state thus accords the personified state the 
privilege of immunity without the concomitant, assumed obligation 
of consent to suit. 
But, beyond this misreading of English legal history, and 
beyond the problematic assignment of the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts’ unmoored form of structural analysis to Charles Black’s 
legacy, there is an even more fundamental problem with Professor 
Manning’s invocation of Black’s work. Manning’s basic premise, 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause is somehow a “master 
provision” that, considered on its own, “allocates decisionmaking 
responsibility”188 simply is inconsistent with Black’s account. Black 
 
 185. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239. 
 186. Id. at *234 n.1. 
 187. Id. at *233–34. Blackstone then quotes Bracton, who asserted:  
The king, . . . ought not to be subject to man, but to God, and to the law; for the law 
maketh the king. Let the king therefore render to the law, what the law has invested in 
him with regard to others, dominion and power: for he is not truly king, where will and 
pleasure rules, and not the law. 
Id. at *234. 
 188. Manning, supra note 11, at 7. 
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did not view the clause as granting power to any particular 
institution, whether it be Congress or the courts. Indeed, his reading 
of McCulloch was that Chief Justice Marshall had already 
determined the constitutional allocation of authority at issue in that 
case, based on more general reasoning, before he even got to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.189 Black, like Marshall, sought to 
ground his work in the broad structures and relationships created by 
the whole document (or large portions of it) and not on individual 
passages, including the precise text of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. To be sure, the Necessary and Proper Clause conceivably 
might be one ingredient, contributing alongside numerous other 
provisions in the rich textual stew supporting the Court’s 
identification of essential structures and relationships embedded in 
the whole Constitution, but standing alone, that bit of text is not, 
under Black’s method, a source of congressional authority, whether 
it be incidental implementation authority or plenary general 
authority.190 
B.  Structural Reasoning and Judicial Restraint 
Manning’s account of the Court’s approach to questions of 
Congressional power over the past eighty-five years is, however, 
instructive in advancing our understanding of the distinct strains of 
structural reasoning in constitutional law. At the heart of Manning’s 
analysis is his identification of a “paradox of contemporary structural 
constitutional law.”191 The paradox is that the Supreme Court 
increasingly has adopted a “new textualism” in matters of statutory 
construction, which has resulted in an approach that is highly 
deferential to Congress’s legislative choices, while simultaneously 
demonstrating less deference to Congress’s exercise of authority in 
cases raising constitutional questions of federal regulatory 
authority.192 Thus, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ new 
structuralism has smuggled general principles of limitation into the 
Tenth Amendment in anti-commandeering cases like New York v. 
United States,193 into the Eleventh Amendment in state sovereign 
 
 189. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 14. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Manning, supra note 11, at 4. 
 192. See id. 
 193. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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immunity cases like Seminole Tribe,194 and into the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in cases like National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.195 As Manning properly points out, all of these 
new doctrines result from a “free-form version” of structural 
reasoning that is not tied to constitutional text, and, as elaborated and 
applied, provides very few limits on judicial discretion.196 
By contrast, Manning’s account of the Supreme Court’s post-
New Deal approach to federalism questions makes clear that those 
cases, although also characterized as rooted in structural reasoning, 
deployed decisional principles derived from the written Constitution 
and were expressly much more deferential to the decision making of 
the political branches.197 On Manning’s telling, the Court’s version 
of structural reasoning in this period was informed by Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch, and resulted in the Court acting 
like a “gentle Thayerian in structural constitutional cases.”198 Like 
Marshall in McCulloch, the post-New Deal Justices conceived of the 
constitutional order as “unfinished” and resting on “a frame of 
government ‘intended to endure for ages’ and ‘to be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs.’”199 This work of adaptation, at least 
in cases involving the scope of federal power, was understood as 
falling within the ken of Congress. Thus, notwithstanding the 
enumerative language in Article 1, Section 8, both Marshall and his 
intellectual heirs on the Court in the post-New Deal era understood 
that “in matters of implementation” Congress had to be accorded 
wide latitude in fashioning legislative policies, and that the Court’s 
job was simply to ensure that those implementation decisions 
comported broadly with the frame of government conveyed by the 
broad structural language of the constitution.200 
 
 194. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 195. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 196. Manning, supra note 11, at 31–32. 
 197. Id. at 10–12. 
 198. Id. at 3, 10–12. Professor Manning’s reference here is to James Bradley Thayer, whose 
1893 article urging judicial restraint in the exercise of the Court’s constitutional judicial review 
authority influenced a generation of constitutional scholars and judges, and ultimately formed the 
foundations for Alexander Bickel’s work. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
 199. Manning, supra note 11, at 10 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819)). 
 200. Id. at 11. 
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Manning reads the post-New Deal federalism cases as relying on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause as the constitutional basis for 
finding this broad congressional authority to determine questions of 
implementation, and argues that that clause ought to serve as a 
textual toehold for the current Court to adopt a similar stance of 
judicial deference towards Congress’s exercise of significant 
incidental powers.201 Absent the anchoring effect of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, Manning is concerned that “free-form” structural 
reasoning would permit unnecessarily broad judicial discretion that 
potentially could place the Court in a position of unwarranted 
activism of the sort he attributes to the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts’ Tenth and Eleventh Amendment adventures.202 The Court’s 
deference in these matters, however, can be just as effectively 
grounded in the Constitution’s essential structures and relationships 
as in a particular reading of the text of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause or any other particular constitutional text taken on its own. In 
fact, when the Court embraces Thayerian modesty on broad grounds 
derived from constitutional structure and relationship, its decisions 
avoid the sort of judicial instrumentalism often evident in the Court’s 
highly subjective interpretations of the Constitution’s various 
provisions of grant or prohibition that “afford reasonable people 
plenty of room to strike the balance in different ways between 
federalism and nationalism or separation and interdependence.”203 
i.  Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority204 
provides a good example of the Court grounding a commitment to 
judicial deference in the Constitution’s broad structures and 
relationships. In repudiating the Court’s more assertive stance in 
National League of Cities v. Usery205 that the Tenth Amendment 
provides a limit on the federal government’s authority to impose 
regulations on the states, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in 
Garcia systematically examined and rejected a range of judicial 
approaches for determining whether a federal statute trenches on a 
 
 201. See id. at 6. 
 202. See id. at 31–32. 
 203. Id. at 32. 
 204. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 205. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528 (1985). 
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“traditional governmental function,” the standard that had developed 
from National League of Cities.206 For good reason, Blackmun 
concluded that looking to tradition and settled state practice would be 
“unworkable” in distinguishing sovereign from proprietary state 
functions, given the evolving and varied roles that state and local 
governments have played over time.207 He also rejected doctrinal 
formulations derived from tort sovereign immunity cases and from 
tax immunity precedent208 before concluding that 
there is a more fundamental problem at work here . . . . The 
problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary 
distinction nor any other that purports to separate out 
important governmental functions can be faithful to the role 
of federalism in a democratic society. . . . Any rule of state 
immunity that looks to the “traditional,” “integral,” or 
“necessary” nature of governmental functions inevitably 
invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies it favors and which ones it 
dislikes.209 
In place of judicially enforceable limitations on Congress’s 
exercise of its Commerce Clause authority over the states, Justice 
Blackmun and his colleagues in the Court’s majority adopted an 
explicit stance of deference to Congress’s legislative choices, noting 
that “the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of 
the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal 
Government itself.”210 By identifying the various means by which 
state interests are safeguarded in the very design of the federal 
system, the Court repudiated the Tenth Amendment judicial activism 
of the National League of Cities majority and avoided the essentially 
insoluble problem of determining, through the parsing of 
constitutional text or otherwise, the shape and extent of state 
immunity from federal laws of general application.211 
 
 206. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538–47. 
 207. Id. at 543–47. 
 208. Id. at 541–43, 545. 
 209. Id. at 545–46. 
 210. Id. at 550. 
 211. Id. at 547–48 (“We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional 
limitations on the scope of Congress’[s] Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by 
relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty.”). 
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ii.  The Necessary and Proper Clause Alternative 
While structural reasoning thus can be a sound basis for the 
Court’s embrace of judicial modesty, the Court’s more recent Tenth 
and Eleventh Amendment cases suggest that, in its more free-form 
manifestations, this approach may not reliably lead to judicial 
restraint.212 Manning’s alternative is to offer up the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as the main textual source of Congress’s broad power 
to adopt incidental measures to implement the plenary general 
authority held by the central government under the constitution.213 
While Manning’s approach seems compelling, it is not clear that it is 
likely to be any more effective in limiting the Court’s unwarranted 
incursions into Congress’s exercise of its constitutional authority. 
Manning’s strategy, to rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
limit judicial discretion by recognizing Congress’s broad 
implementing authority, necessarily locks in the enumerative 
language of Article I, Section 8 as the principal source of the federal 
government’s plenary general authority subject to Congress’s 
implementation.214 As discussed earlier, however, while some of the 
specific provisions of grant and prohibition in Article I’s 
enumeration have worn well over time, others have fallen out of 
alignment with the underlying economic, social, cultural, and 
political context within which the Constitution must operate.215 In 
those instances, where the enumeration represents a miscalculation, 
significant pressure is placed on the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
bring constitutional doctrine into alignment with contemporary 
circumstance and, indirectly, with the deeper structures and 
relationships that ground the constitutional order. Not surprisingly, 
because of ongoing contests over the meaning and scope of some of 
the most important enumerated powers, the Court’s characterization 
of (and reliance on) the Necessary and Proper Clause has not been a 
model of consistency. 
 
 212. See Manning, supra note 11, at 31–39. 
 213. See id. at 63–65. Manning notes that the Necessary and Proper Clause operates not only 
by reference to other express powers held by Congress under the constitution but also upon “all 
the ‘Powers’ vested by the Constitution anywhere in the government.” Id. at 63. 
 214. See id. Manning is careful to say that the powers conferred on Congress by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, while broad and extensive, are incidental to and meant to 
implement the general plenary powers conveyed by other provisions in the Constitution. 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 146–58. 
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Thus, in Comstock, which involved a constitutional challenge to 
a federal statute permitting the civil commitment of individuals in the 
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons upon a finding that those 
individuals have a serious mental disability or disorder and are 
“sexually dangerous,” Justice Breyer, writing for a seven-person 
majority, offered two apparently inconsistent formulations of the so-
called “sweeping clause.”216 On the one hand, he asserted that “the 
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to 
enact federal legislation.”217 On the other hand, he noted that “the 
Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s 
grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by 
broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or 
‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”218 In elaborating 
his “makes clear” language, Breyer quoted Marshall in McCulloch, 
noting that Congress’s broad implementing powers are drawn from a 
“vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the 
constitution.”219 This distinction between “granting” power versus 
“making clear” its availability may seem an unimportant semantic 
difference with little practical doctrinal significance, but the 
ambiguity in Justice Breyer’s varying characterizations does signal a 
deeper problem with the Court’s practice of linking its understanding 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause to its (unstable) treatment of the 
Commerce Clause and other provisions within the enumerations in 
Article I, Section 8. If the enumerated general power is construed 
narrowly, significant pressure is placed on the Court, at least in those 
instances where the federal regulatory effort is otherwise welcomed 
by the Justices, to read the Necessary and Proper Clause as a specific 
textual source for additional constitutional authority. If, however, the 
enumerated power is read broadly—or interpreted pragmatically to 
go beyond its literal terms—then the Necessary and Proper Clause 
commands less attention from the Court and becomes, at best, a 
confirmatory textual basis for that result.220 
 
 216. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129–30 (2010); cf. Lawson & Granger, supra 
note 167 (referring to the Necessary and Proper Clause as “the Sweeping Clause”). 
 217. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added). 
 218. Id. at 133–34 (emphasis added) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 413, 418 (1819)). 
 219. Id. 
 220. In Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), for example, a disagreement among the 
Justices about the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, which directs Congress “[t]o make 
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This dynamic can be seen most clearly in the contrast between 
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Gonzales v. Raich221 and 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence.222 The issue in Gonzales was whether 
the federal statute regulating drugs, the Controlled Substances Act 
 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” in turn led the Court to 
disagree on the very question of whether the Necessary and Proper Clause conveys any authority 
at all to Congress. The case concerned the constitutional validity of peace time court martial trials 
of civilians “accompanying the armed forces outside the United States” who were “charged with 
noncapital offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 235. In the 
course of considering whether the due process clause was implicated by the procedural limitations 
of the military trials offered the civilians, Justice Clark for the majority observed: 
Nor do we believe that due process considerations bring about an expansion of Clause 
14 through the operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. If the exercise of the 
power is valid it is because it is granted in Clause 14, not because of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. The latter clause is not itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the 
Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the specifically granted 
“foregoing” powers of § 8 “and all other Powers vested by this Constitution . . . .” As 
James Madison explained, the Necessary and Proper Clause is “but merely a 
declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into 
execution those [powers] otherwise granted are included in the grant.” 
Id. at 247 (first emphasis added) (omission in original). 
In dissent, Justice Harlan took issue with the majority’s reading of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, 
and of the due process implications of trying civilians according to the procedural rules of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Writing for himself and for Justice Frankfurter, Harlan stated: 
Of course, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be used to “expand” powers which 
are otherwise constitutionally limited, but that is only to say that when an asserted 
power is not appropriate to the exercise of an express power, to which all “necessary 
and proper” powers must relate, the asserted power is not a “proper” one. But to say, as 
the Court does now, that the Necessary and Proper Clause “is not itself a grant of 
power” is to disregard Clause 18 as one of the enumerated powers of § 8 of Art. I. 
Id. at 254–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
In part, this inconsistent understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause derives from the 
Court’s inconsistent treatment of the enumerative language of Article 1, Section 8 as either 
formally setting the boundaries of federal government power or as the starting point for a more 
practical, empirical understanding of federalism. When the Court veers towards formalism, it is 
more inclined to lean heavily on the Necessary and Proper Clause as a workaround. When, on the 
other hand, the Court’s reading of the Commerce Clause and other provisions of grant and 
prohibition are capacious, their need for and reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause is 
reduced. Professor Black would argue that this dynamic, which produces doctrinal inconsistency, 
compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked authority 
under the Commerce Clause to enact a section of the Violence Against Women Act, which 
provided a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1 (2005) (holding Congress possessed authority under the Commerce Clause to extend the 
Controlled Substances Act to the cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use), and 
undermines judicial candor, could be avoided by reverting to reasoning from structure and 
relation. 
 221. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 222. See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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(CSA),223 as applied to the intrastate possession of medical marijuana 
pursuant to a valid state law, exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority.224 Justice Stevens framed the question as a “modest one,” 
which was whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that 
possession of locally produced medical marijuana, in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.225 Given the 
comprehensive closed regulatory scheme that Congress had adopted 
in the CSA, Stevens and his majority colleagues determined that 
Congress could rationally have concluded that medical marijuana 
authorized under State law might be drawn into the regulated 
interstate market for illegal marijuana, and on that basis could be 
prohibited by the federal statute.226 
Crucially, given that the Court was working within the modern 
Commerce Clause framework it had established in Lopez and United 
States v. Morrison,227 the question whether the regulated activity 
itself was economic in nature became an issue essential to 
determining the reach of the Commerce Clause.228 Justice Stevens 
addressed this element of the Lopez/Morrison framework by 
explaining that “the activities regulated by the CSA are 
quintessentially economic. ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities.’”229 Noting that the 
CSA regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of 
drugs, and that the intrastate consumption of medical marijuana falls 
within that broad definition, the majority determined that the 
Lopez/Morrison requirement, that the substantial effects prong of the 
Commerce Clause test be limited to economic activities, had been 
satisfied.230 
 
 223. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2018), is Title II of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 
1236, 1242 (1970). 
 224. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 5. 
 225. Id. at 22. 
 226. See id. at 27–29. 
 227. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 228. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 24–26; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995); 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–13. 
 229. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25–26 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). 
 230. See id. at 26. While Justice Stevens mentions the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
passing, it is clear that the opinion does not place primary, or even significant, reliance on that 
provision as the basis for finding congressional authority in this case. See id. at 5. 
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Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, based his conclusion 
that the CSA, as applied, was constitutional on grounds he 
characterized as, “if not inconsistent with that of the Court, at least 
more nuanced.”231 Scalia’s “more nuanced” approach placed much 
greater emphasis than did Justice Stevens on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as the principal source of the federal government’s 
authority to regulate local medical marijuana and did so precisely 
because he defined the terms of the Lopez/Morrison limitation of the 
Commerce Clause to economic activities more narrowly.232 Scalia 
rejected the majority’s characterization of consumption as an 
economic activity and thereby concluded that the possession and use 
of medical marijuana at issue in Gonzales was noneconomic,233 but 
he nonetheless determined that “Congress may regulate even 
noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a 
more general regulation of interstate commerce.”234 Thus, because, 
in Scalia’s view, Congress derives authority from the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to legislate with respect to activities not otherwise 
within their enumerated power, when reaching those noneconomic 
activities is an essential “means” to accomplishing a legitimate 
constitutional “end,” the application of the CSA to the possession 
and use of medical marijuana that had been sanctioned by state law 
was permissible.235 
What this dispute over the dictionary definition of the term 
“economic” obscures,236 and what is also missed in the indirectly 
linked disagreement over whether the Necessary and Proper Clause 
confers implementing federal regulatory authority or merely 
confirms its existence, is a more fundamental question concerning 
the capacity of individual states to manage difficult problems of 
public policy, the effects of which reverberate through national (and 
global) markets. Instead of consulting Webster’s Third for the 
meaning of a term such as “economic,” the Court would be well 
served to consider the respective institutional competences of the 
 
 231. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 232. See id. at 34–36. 
 233. See id. at 40. 
 234. Id. at 37. 
 235. Id. at 37, 39–41. 
 236. Not to mention the Court’s shifting practice of insisting either that the regulated activity 
must be economic or alternatively, as in Wickard, merely that the effects of that activity in the 
aggregate must be economic. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942). 
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competing regulators (state legislatures and administrative agencies 
versus Congress and associated federal agencies) in any given 
instance, and the challenges presented as a result of state 
coordination problems;237 the need for policy experimentation in the 
context of varying state and local conditions;238 and the gains and 
losses in electoral responsiveness when questions are addressed at 
the state or federal level.239 In her dissent in Gonzales, Justice 
O’Connor raised some of these core questions, but she did so in an 
abbreviated fashion given that her opinion was constrained by the 
limited framing offered by Lopez and Morrison.240 The Court’s 
analysis in Comstock also engaged some of these questions 
respecting the relative capacity and willingness of individual states 
versus the federal government to manage the particular problem at 
issue there, although the discussion toggled uncomfortably between a 
formalist consideration of the Necessary and Proper Clause and a 
more practical, empirical discussion of the particular shortcomings in 
individual state-level responses to the problem of sexually dangerous 
persons released from federal custody that had led Congress to 
intervene in the first place.241 
 
 237. See Game Theoretical Perspective, supra note 163, at 26–56; Conflicting Premises, 
supra note 163, at 468–71. 
 238. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (describing a model in which “subnational” 
units of government are free to set goals and craft strategies for implementing them). But see 
David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of 
Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) (offering critique of democratic 
experimentalism). 
 239. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992) (“But where the Federal 
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of 
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”). 
 240. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 42–57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 241. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 144–46, 176–78 (2010). Justice Breyer 
emphasized that the challenged federal statute “requires accommodation of state interests,” 
because it mandates notice to the state in which a federal prisoner “is domiciled or was tried” and 
requires that the prisoner be released to state custody if the state wishes to take responsibility, but 
is nonetheless necessary because many states do not take such responsibility given that lengthy 
federal incarceration often severs an individual’s ties to his or her home state. Id. at 144–46. 
Justice Thomas disagreed that the statute respects the authority of state civil commitment 
authorities and with the premise that states would not be available to take charge of a dangerous 
person upon his or her release from federal prison. See id. at 176–78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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C.  Professor Black’s Pragmatism 
If the Justices in these cases and others like them were to take 
seriously Charles Black’s method of reasoning from structure and 
relationship instead of becoming consumed in flights of formulaic 
reasoning centered on narrow constitutional provisions of grant and 
prohibition, this distracting doctrinal noise could be minimized or 
even eliminated. There likely would continue to be considerable 
subjectivity in the Court’s reasoning, but working from structural 
premises and the perceived exigencies of institutional arrangements 
would tend to emphasize the features of constitutional disputes, 
especially disputes over the power of the federal government, that 
actually motivate the competing positions on the Court.242 
Comparing Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion in 
Sebelius with Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion helps to make this 
point.243 At issue in Sebelius was the constitutionality of the so-
called individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act, which required 
most Americans to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance 
or pay a penalty to the Internal Revenue Service.244 A majority of the 
Justices determined that the individual mandate in the ACA was 
beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, although a 
differently configured majority upheld the mandate as a permissible 
exercise of the taxing authority.245 On the Commerce Clause issue, 
 
 242. As Professor Blasi points out, the Court’s adoption of Black’s method could also impact 
the way some disputes are framed from the inception and thereby change the nature of the 
information that is made available to judges.  
To the extent that structural reasoning would result in a refashioning of lawsuits, with 
different information coming to the attention of judges, Black’s structural approach 
may well lead to judicial intuitions and preconceptions that can be considered to be 
more sophisticated and thereby, quite apart from subjective desirability of the results 
that might ensue, improvements of “process.” 
Blasi, supra note 14, at 189–90. Moreover, the more common use of reasoning from structure and 
relationship could shift the focus of potential litigants and courts from “particularized grievances” 
to “complaints that concern systemic shortcomings.” Id. at 186. These shifts in information, issue 
framing and systems analysis, in turn, could impact “even the lawsuits that are brought.” Id. at 
185. 
 243. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547–58 (2012) (asserting 
the individual mandate of the ACA is beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause powers because it 
does not regulate existing commerce), with id. at 604–08 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (asserting that the ACA instead regulates inevitable market participation). 
 244. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2018). More recently, in Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 
(5th Cir. 2019), the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court ruling that the ACA’s individual mandate 
is unconstitutional because it no longer carries a tax penalty that generates tax revenues but 
declined to find the entire statute unconstitutional. Id. at 390, 393. 
 245. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 558, 563–66. 
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the Chief Justice relied on two principal grounds for concluding that 
the Commerce Clause does not support the imposition of a federal 
obligation to purchase health insurance. The first ground centered on 
the word “regulate” in the Commerce Clause.246 Roberts’s highly 
formalistic analysis reasoned that, while the text confers upon 
Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, it does 
not grant Congress the power to create the activity or class of 
activities to be regulated. “The power to regulate commerce,” he 
explained, “presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be 
regulated.”247 To support this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted that 
constitutional text grants Congress the power both to “coin Money” 
and to “regulate the Value thereof,” and to “raise and support 
Armies . . . and naval Forces” and to “make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”248 From 
these features he concluded that, if the power to regulate includes the 
“power to bring the subject of the regulation into existence,” then the 
provisions governing money and the armed forces would be 
superfluous, thus violating the rule against surplusage.249 
In addition to this extraordinarily literal textualist argument 
centered on one word in a provision of grant or prohibition, Chief 
Justice Roberts also mounted an argument that the individual 
mandate exceeds Congress’s authority because it undermines broad 
notions of state sovereignty inherent in American federalism and 
operationalized through the requirement that authority exercised by 
Congress pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause must be 
“proper.”250 While nominally a ground for decision based on specific 
text—the word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause—
Professor Manning argues that Roberts’s elaboration of the principles 
of state sovereignty and federalism in this instance is an example of 
structural reasoning of the sort he regards as problematic.251 The 
Chief Justice signaled his intention to draw upon broad constitutional 
 
 246. See id. at 547–58. 
 247. Id. at 550. 
 248. See id. (discussing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 5, 12–14). 
 249. Id. Notably, Justice Ginsburg and the other justices joining her dissent argued that the 
action/inaction distinction itself is suspect in this context. In their view, the ACA’s individual 
mandate does not force activity but instead regulates inevitable market participation. See id. at 
604–08 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 250. See id. at 559–61. 
 251. See Manning, supra note 11, at 41–42. 
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principles to support his position by pointing out early in his opinion 
the following features of the American constitutional system: first, 
Congress’s powers are limited by the terms of the enumeration in 
Article I, Section 8;252 second, the Constitution is not the source of 
the states’ police powers, which remained in the states as a residuum 
after limited federal powers were conferred by way of the written 
Constitution;253 and third, the state sovereignty thus retained is a 
source of individual liberty, because it ensures that “the facets of 
governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally 
administered by smaller governments closer to the governed” and 
“also serves as a check on the power of the Federal Government.”254 
Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion, by contrast, is also based 
primarily on reasoning from structure and relationship.255 But 
Ginsburg announced a very different set of constitutional principles 
to ground her analysis. First, she identified the individual state 
incompetence principle, which she described as central to the 
Framers’ response to the failures of the Articles of Confederation.256 
The Articles, she reminds, “proved unworkable, because the 
individual States, understandably focused on their own economic 
interests, often failed to take actions critical to the success of the 
Nation as a whole.”257 Consequently, their “solution” was to give 
Congress “authority to enact economic legislation ‘in all Cases for 
the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which 
the States are separately incompetent.’”258 Next, Justice Ginsburg 
explained that, because “[t]he Framers understood that the ‘general 
Interests of the Union’ would change over time, in ways they could 
not anticipate,” they devised a written constitution intended to serve 
 
 252. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 534 (“The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of 
powers, because ‘[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.’” (quoting Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (alteration in original))). 
 253. Id. at 535–36. 
 254. Id. at 536. 
 255. See id. at 599–604 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition to 
setting out an analysis based on broad principles, Justice Ginsburg also responds to the Chief 
Justice’s narrow argument centered on the meaning of the word “regulate” and the distinction he 
draws between action and inaction. See id. at 609–14. 
 256. Id. at 599–600. 
 257. Id. at 600. 
 258. Id. (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOL. 2, supra note 22, at 
131–32). 
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as “a ‘great outlin[e],’ not a detailed blueprint.”259 And finally, 
Ginsburg urged an interpretive approach to the Commerce Clause 
that is based on “‘practical’ considerations, including ‘actual 
experience,’”260 and suggested that this “pragmatic approach,” rather 
than Roberts’s formalist reading, was “[c]onsistent with the Framers’ 
intent.”261 
Writing in the Georgetown Law Journal before the Supreme 
Court announced its decision in Sebelius, Professors Leslie Meltzer 
Henry and Maxwell Stearns argued that the ACA’s individual 
mandate “fits well within those cases for which congressional 
commerce power is justified to avoid the risk that competing state 
policies will force other states into a problematic separating game, 
thereby undermining the selected regulatory policy.”262 Justice 
Ginsburg’s analysis, grounded in the basic principles she identified, 
adopted the intuition suggested by Meltzer Henry and Stearns. Thus, 
she concluded: 
States that undertake health-care reforms on their own thus 
risk “placing themselves in a position of economic 
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors.” 
Facing that risk, individual States are unlikely to take the 
initiative in addressing the problem of the uninsured, even 
though solving that problem is in all States’ best interests. 
Congress’ intervention was needed to overcome this 
collective-action impasse.263 
One could certainly conclude that Chief Justice Roberts’s 
judgment (that public health policy is better determined at the state 
level where decision makers are closer to their constituents) was 
superior to Justice Ginsburg’s evaluation (that the dynamics of the 
national market for health care services and health insurance render 
individual states suboptimal policy makers), but it is difficult to see 
how the Justices’ strained arguments over the meaning of the phrase 
“to regulate,” or their arcane disagreements over whether the 
 
 259. Id. at 601 (second alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). 
 260. Id. (quoting Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 
(1937)). 
 261. Id. at 601–02. 
 262. Henry & Stearns, supra note 81, at 1118. 
 263. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 595 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citations omitted). 
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regulated subject of the ACA’s individual mandate was “action” or 
“inaction,” advanced any of the real interests at stake. Reasonable 
people can certainly differ over these fundamental questions, and 
over the prior question of which institution (Congress or the Court) 
ought to have the final word on the matter, but pretending that the 
narrow textual provisions of grant and prohibition developed by 
delegates to the constitutional convention are the best, or even a 
good, way to resolve these questions disserves the very enterprise of 
maintaining and operating a workable constitutional order.264 
CONCLUSION 
Charles Black’s central insight was that candor and clarity in the 
project of constitutional interpretation are advanced when the 
Supreme Court and other courts exercising the power of judicial 
review frankly embrace a methodology of reasoning from 
constitutional structure and institutional relationships. Notably, Black 
taught that the appropriate use of reasoning from structure and 
relationship is a form of textual construction, not a repudiation of 
text. He insisted that the Court should embrace “a close and 
perpetual interworking between the textual and the relational and 
structural modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations 
concerned are themselves created by the text, and inference drawn 
from them must surely be controlled by the text.”265 
Black certainly understood that clause-bound textual 
interpretation had been and would continue to be a significant 
component of the work of the Court. “[S]o long as we continue to 
look on our Constitution as a part of the law applicable in court, just 
so long the work of sheer textual interpretation will be a great part—
probably the greatest part—of judicial work in constitutional law.”266 
Even the parsing of individual provisions of grant or prohibition, 
however, requires the exercise, more or less, of interpretive 
 
 264. On this account, constitutional interpretation and implementation occur throughout the 
government, and indeed outside of government, as well as in the courts. An approach to 
constitutional judicial review that highlights underlying structural principles and institutional 
relationships instead of focusing on sterile bits of text considered in isolation is likely to facilitate 
the interactive process by which these various actors engage one another and, in the process, 
recommit to the constitutional order. For a fuller account of the operation of constitutionalism 
outside of the courts, see GRABER, supra note 60. 
 265. BLACK, supra note 1, at 31. 
 266. Id. 
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judgment. Often, the rules by which individual passages of grant or 
prohibition are decoded derive from broader structural and relational 
directives that in turn can be traced to other portions of the written 
constitution (or to the constitutional text taken as a whole).267 
Professor Black’s recognition of this essential dialogue between 
text and structure, both in cases involving relatively narrow 
prescriptive constitutional passages, as well as in cases that expressly 
implicate the institutional relations that derive from broad 
constitutional structure, distinguishes his approach from the new 
structuralism of the Rehnquist and Roberts courts. His notion of 
dialogue invites us to read constitutional language in context and 
moves us toward an understanding of constitutional practice that, 
while rooted in the written text, also draws insight from the tradition 
of unwritten constitutional development. 
Provisions that have served to advance the broader objectives of 
the American constitutional enterprise are entitled to greater fidelity 
and should be relied upon in determining the outcome in specific 
instances of constitutional controversy. Others that have receded in 
practical importance because of their misfit with ongoing 
circumstances or that have essentially been rewritten or reimagined 
by subsequent decisions should be accorded an appropriately reduced 
weight, given that diminished practical importance and/or revision 
over time. On those occasions where it is plain that a provision of 
grant or prohibition, such as the Commerce Clause, was the product 
of significant miscalculation,268 it is appropriate for the Supreme 
Court and other reviewing courts to look to the broader constitutional 
principles embedded in the document’s structures and institutional 
relationships to resolve ongoing questions of national importance. 
The repeated endorsement by the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention of the principle that the federal government should 
exercise authority when the states individually cannot was not 
displaced by the enumerative language of Article I, Section 8. The 
 
 267. All texts, including constitutional texts, must be read according to an agreed upon set of 
rules. Ian Bartrum, drawing broadly on the language theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has 
explained that “language is something we do, not something that we have. Further, like a game, 
language is a rule-governed activity; which is to say that it is rules, not instruments (e.g. pieces or 
balls) that give a particular action or utterance a particular ‘meaning.’” Ian C. Bartrum, 
Wittgenstein’s Poker: Contested Constitutionalism and the Limits of Public Meaning 
Originalism, 10 WASH. UNIV. JURIS. REV. 29, 35 (2017). 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 145–57. 
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enumerations, including the Commerce Clause, are surely part of the 
text—the Constitution as law—with which courts and others charged 
with constitutional interpretation must work, but these provisions 
should be read in context and in the light shed by history and 
experience, and according to a process of reasoning from 
constitutional structure and institutional relationships. 
 
 
